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JAPAN AND THE MONEYLENDERS— 
ACTIVIST COURTS AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE 
Andrew M. Pardieck† 
Abstract:  Problems with sub-prime loans roiled financial markets worldwide in 
2007 and brought renewed attention to predatory lending practices by loan brokers in the 
United States.  Questionable lending practices, however, plague consumer financial 
markets worldwide, including one of the largest, found in Japan.  This Article addresses 
the Japanese response to systemic problems in its consumer finance market.  Over the last 
forty years, the judiciary has led and the Diet followed.  Most recently, in 2006, the 
Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions that turned the single most important 
earnings driver for the consumer finance industry into dead letter law.  The Diet followed 
with legislative revisions.  Both actions have imposed restrictions unheard of in the 
United States and drastically reshaped the financial industry in Japan.  This Article 
analyzes these recent changes and places them in context.  Doing so offers more than 
description and a point of comparison.  It provides a window into the evolution of 
Japanese private law.  It provides evidence that challenges the conventional wisdom on 
Japan.  The Japanese judiciary is neither weak nor ineffectual.  It is not limited to 
following the dictates of the Liberal Democratic Party or bureaucracy or filling in 
legislative lacuna.  It has not limited itself to activism in the service of stability or 
community.  In private law matters, it has come to act aggressively:  repeatedly 
invalidating black letter law and providing substantive as opposed to procedural justice.  
This work shows the Japanese judiciary has not evolved into a monolithic bureaucracy, 
but one often driven by activist lower courts.  The historical context and discussion of 
recent developments in consumer finance law offers insight into legal changes affecting 
the Japanese financial markets today, as well as the evolution of the role of law and the 
rule of law in Japan. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Even with the uptick in Japan’s economy,1 after fifteen years of 
recession and stagnation, the numbers are still pretty bleak.  In 2006, one in 
every nine Japanese, one in every seven adults, was indebted to a lender 
                                           
†
 Andrew M. Pardieck, Affiliate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, 
Seattle; Of Counsel, The Pardieck Law Firm.  This Article was written while a Visiting Scholar at the 
University of Washington.  I would like to thank Rob Britt, Lawton Hawkings, Naoki Iwamoto, Mark 
Levin, Luke Nottage, Ken Port, Veronica Taylor, Mark Ramseyer, Nobuhisa Segawa, Hiroo Sono, and 
Megan Starich for their helpful comments and suggestions.  Any errors or omissions are solely mine, as are 
the translations unless otherwise noted.  Translations of statutes follow the article, paragraph, item format 
established in the government’s Standard Bilingual Legal Dictionary (Mar. 2006), http://www.cas.go.jp/ 
jp/seisaku/hourei/dictionary.pdf.  Where available, cases are cited to the Supreme Court’s web site rather 
than a commercial reporter.  Historical materials are cited to the original and if reproduced in whole or part 
in modern secondary sources to those as well. 
1
  See, e.g., Patrick Barta, Markets Brace for Impact Of Japan's Growing Hunger, WALL ST. J., May 
16, 2006, at C1; Sebastian Moffett & Phred Dvorak, Rising Sun: After Long Decline, Japan's Economy Is 
Stirring to Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at A1; Andrew Morse, Japan Data Bolster Case For Growth, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at A11; Akane Vallery Uchida & Andrew Morse, Land Prices in Japan 
Reverse Slide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007 at A5. 
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reporting to the Federation of Credit Bureaus of Japan.2  Out of a population 
of approximately 127 million people,3 over 22 million were registered with 
the federation, including 14 million currently in debt, double that from 
1991.4 
The majority of Japan’s borrowers are temporary workers and 
pensioners.5  Most remain in debt for 6.5 years; approximately 30% remain 
in debt for ten years or more.6  In 2006, approximately 2.3 million borrowers 
were classified as heavily in debt, in debt to five or more lenders,7 and 2.7 
million were behind on payments to consumer finance companies and in 
default.8 
Actual numbers then and now are likely much worse.  Government 
statistics from 2005 showed over 14,000 money lenders registered with 
either the central or a local government and only 2079 members of the 
Federation of Credit Bureaus.9  In other words, a large number of lenders are 
not using established credit bureaus and their borrowers are not included in 
the above statistics.10 
                                           
2
  Utsunomiya Kenji, Kashikingyō Kisei no Kadai—Shōhisha no Tachiba Kara, 1319 JURISTO 13, 19 
(2006). 
3
  STATISTICS BUREAU, JAPAN MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMC’N, STATISTICAL 
HANDBOOK OF JAPAN 8 (2007), available at http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/handbook/c02cont.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2007); Statistics Bureau, Population Estimates: Monthly Report, Nov. 1, 2007 (Final 
Estimates), http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/tsuki/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2008). 
4
  Shōhisha Kinyū, Seigenhō Kosu Risoku: “Hai-iro Kinri” Jisshitsu Hitei, ASAHI SHINBUN, Jan. 14, 
2006, at 43; Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 13. 
5
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 19. 
6
  Id. at 17. 
7
  Akemi Nakamura, Will Lending Law Revision Put Brakes on Debt-Driven Suicide?, THE JAPAN 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006; Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14.    
8
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14.  
9
  Id.; Zenkoku Shinyō Jōhō Senta-Rengoukai, Zenjōren Tōkei, http://www.fcbj.jp/data/ 
figures/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
10
  Straight comparisons with the United States are difficult.  The Federal Reserve in its most recent 
2004 survey of consumer finance offers statistics per family instead of per individual.  The share of 
families carrying debt was 76.4%; however, 47.9% of this total was debt secured by a primary residence, 
i.e. a home mortgage.  Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 
2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. Bull. (2006), at A26, 30-31, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf.  Credit cards are another primary 
source of debt: in 2004, 46.2% of families carried a median credit card balance of $2200.  Distressed debt 
indicators for 2004 showed 12.2% of families carrying income to debt ratios of over 40% and 8.9% of 
families delinquent on at least one debt payment.  See id. at A35.  Non-business bankruptcy filings trended 
upward from 1996 through 2006, spiked in 2005, and then plummeted in 2006 because of the changes 
brought about by the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.  American 
Bankruptcy Institute, 2006 Bankruptcies Fall to Lowest Levels Since 1980s (Apr. 17, 2007), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CO
NTENTID=46645; American Bankruptcy Institute, Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year 
1980-2006 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home& 
TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=46621.  Payday lending in the United States offers 
an additional point of comparison.  The industry did not exist before the 1990s, and by 2004 estimates 
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Most borrowers borrow down, starting with mainstream consumer 
finance companies, and after exhausting their credit with those sources, 
moving to the mid-size and small consumer finance companies, and then the 
black market.11  Many file for bankruptcy, 184,422 in 2005, sixteen times 
more than in 1990.12  Many attempt to disappear or “run away under the 
cover of night” (yonige).  The numbers are hard to believe, but some 
estimate as many as 100,000 each year.13  Interviews show that many wind 
up homeless.14  Others resort to suicide.15  In 2005, 32,522 committed 
suicide, including 7756 for economic reasons, a slight improvement from the 
high in 2003.16  In comparison, the number of fatalities from traffic accidents 
in Japan is below 7000. 17  
In December 2006, the Japanese Diet acted, but they did not act in 
response to these numbers.  The numbers peaked in 2003.18  They acted in 
response to the Japanese Supreme Court.  In the first three months of 2006, 
the Supreme Court handed down six decisions interpreting Japan’s usury 
laws and the laws regulating the consumer finance industry.19  All of them 
overturned lower court decisions for the lender; the combination of them 
turned statutory law into dead letter law.20  The bureaucracy and the Diet 
                                                                                                                              
suggested there were over 22,000 payday lenders nationwide with a loan volume of over $40 billion.  Joe 
Mahon, Banking on the Fringe, FEDGAZETTE (July 2004), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
pubs/fedgaz/04-07/banking.cfm#.  Industry analysts have estimated that about 5% of the U.S. population 
has taken out payday loans at some point; many become chronic borrowers, with surveys suggesting over 
40% both roll over their loans and borrow from multiple lenders.  See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, 
Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 14, 19-21 
(2003), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/CC_Payday_lending.pdf. 
11
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 19.  See Akemi Nakamura & Mayumi Negishi, Consumer Lenders’ 
Dirty but Open Secret, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 18, 2006.  
12
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14; Kinyūchō, Kashikingyō Seido Nado ni Kansuru Kondankai no 
Kaisai ni Tsuite, TŌKEI SHIRYŌ NADO, http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/16/kinyu/f-20050427-2.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2007).   
13
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 15-16.  
14
  Id. 
15
  For a discussion suggesting a causal link between suicide and insolvency law, see MARK D. WEST, 
LAW IN EVERYDAY JAPAN: SEX, SUMO, SUICIDE AND STATUTES 223-65 (2005). 
16
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 15-16; Kinyūcho, Kashikingyō Seido Nado ni Kansuru Kondankai 
no Kaisai ni Tsuite, TŌKEI SHIRYŌ NADO, http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/16/kinyu/f-20050427-2.html 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2007).   
17
  Japan to Tackle High Suicide Rate, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/asia-pacific/5082616.stm. 
18
  See infra text accompanying notes 361-362. 
19
  See infra text accompanying notes 318-339.  Blackstone noted that money lent on contract for 
compensation “is called interest by those who think it legal, and usury by those who do not so.”  WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *454.  This Article uses the term without intending any such distinction 
but rather to describe the practice of lending money at a high rate of interest.  According to Black’s, usury 
is defined as “[h]istorically, the lending of money with interest” and today as “the charging of an illegal 
rate of interest” or “[a]n illegally high rate of interest.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (8th ed. 2004). 
20
  See infra text accompanying notes 318-339. 
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played catch-up and when they caught up with legislation in 2006, they 
came down relatively hard on usury and the money lending industry in 
Japan.  Henceforth, for the finance companies in Japan, there are new 
interest rate caps, new duties imposed on the lenders, and increased criminal 
penalties; for the consumer, there is less credit. 21 
The new legislation is the latest addition to a history of legislative and 
judicial efforts to regulate money lending in Japan that stretches back over 
eight hundred years.22  Like usury law in the West, these efforts provide an 
opportunity to examine an evolution in legal norms governing a basic 
transaction that remains fundamentally unchanged:  lending money at 
interest.  An examination of that evolution in Japan shows, in a microcosm, 
the history and evolution of private law in Japan:  1) from an early, well-
developed policy and practice of micro-managing private law for public 
purposes, 2) to a private law regime embracing “freedom of contract” and 
judicial restraint, 3) to a paternalistic conception of private law driven by the 
judiciary.23 
This new legislation, when placed in context, shows that the Japanese 
judiciary, an institution often characterized as conservative and ineffectual, 
can and does act as a “liberal” and decisive force within Japanese society.  
Judicial activism is not limited to “activism in the service of stability,” or 
even activism in the service of community.24  The judiciary does more than 
simply fill in legislative lacunae.25 
In the areas of usury law and consumer finance in Japan, instead of 
jury nullification, one finds judicial nullification.  The judiciary has rejected 
attempts by the bureaucracy and Diet to legislatively revise judicially 
established norms.  It has cast itself as an arbiter of societal norms and, 
through a technical application of the law, imposed substantive as opposed 
to procedural justice.  In this area of private law, the judiciary has driven the 
bureaucracy and Diet.  In this area of the law, the judiciary has radically 
                                           
21
  See infra text accompanying notes 411-456. 
22
  See, e.g., ONO SHŪSEI, RISOKU SEIGENHŌ TO KŌJO RYŌZOKU 208 (1999); 1 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 120 (1969). 
23
  In the civil law tradition, “[l]aw is divided up into clearly delimited fields.  Public law and private 
law . . . are treated as inherently different and clearly distinguishable.” JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE 
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 63, 68, 91 (2d ed. 1985).  
24
  See Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service 
of – Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 638 (1996).  See also JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE 
LAW 124 (1998). 
25
  See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the Public Trust 
(Aug. 23, 2003) (unpublished paper), available at http://law.wustl.edu/higls/papers/lectures/2003-
3HaleyJapaneseJudiciary.html#_ftnref3). 
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changed the governing legal norms, which, in turn, in 2006 radically 
changed the financial markets in Japan.   
Finally, this legislation, placed in context, shines light on a Japanese 
society that is still coming to terms with the bursting of the Japanese 
economic bubble fifteen years ago.26  Fifteen years of painful economic 
restructuring has changed the balance of power.  The 2006 legislative 
process suggests there are increasingly powerful younger members of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) responsible to a constituency stretching 
beyond traditional business interests, and increasingly large, but often 
muted, foreign stakeholders. 
This Article will examine each of these points.  Part II will examine 
the legislative and judicial history of interest rate restriction laws as well as 
the judicial precedent that preceded the 2006 legislation.  It will briefly 
examine the law governing money lending found in the Tokugawa era 
(1603-1867), followed by the legislative reforms that accompanied the Meiji 
Reformation, and the decisions from the Great Court of Cassation, imperial 
Japan’s highest court.  Part II will focus though on the legislation and 
caselaw that followed the end of World War II and preceded the changes in 
2006.  Part III will examine the impetus for the the 2006 legislative reforms, 
the outlines of the new lending laws, and the aftermath, including the 
restructuring of the consumer financial markets in Japan.  Part IV will seek 
to place this discussion in a broader context.  Discussion of whether 
Japanese law permits 12% or 15% interest or whether the Japanese courts 
deem certain payments “construed interest” or not, without more, would 
scarcely justify the paper and ink expended.  Part V argues that there is 
more; that usury law, as dry as it sounds, offers broad insights into the role 
of law and the rule of law in Japan.  
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY 
A. The Tokugawa Era  
Usury laws in Japan date back at least to the Kamakura Dynasty 
(1185-1336).27  There was not a total prohibition against lending money at 
interest, as seen in Western Europe, but abundant records detail prohibitions 
                                           
26
  In 1989 the Tokyo Stock Exchange had a market value of $4.3 trillion and was the largest in the 
world having surpassed even that of the New York Stock Exchange.  In 1991 the Bubble burst and by 1995 
the market value of the Tokyo exchange had declined to $3.6 trillion, or roughly 60% of the New York 
Stock Exchange.  See Sekai no Shuyō Kabushiki Shijō, ASAHI SHINBUN, Oct. 8, 1996, at 13; Shinichi 
Terada, Lending Legislation Reforms Spell Industry Shakeout, THE JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, available 
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nb20061214a2.html. 
27
  1 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 120. 
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on interest due on bills of exchange.28  Records from the Muromachi Period 
(1336-1573) detail more inclusive interest rate restrictions:  interest rates on 
all money loans were capped at 5% per month.29   
The records from both of these periods, however, are spotty.  It was 
not until after the Warring States Period (1467-1583), the subsequent 
unification of Japan, and the beginning of the extended rule of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate (1603-1867) that we see a comprehensive treatment of usury law.  
The Tokugawa Shogunate created an extensive body of law, both judicial 
precedent and administrative orders, which wholly endorsed government 
restriction of money lending at interest.30 
Early on, the Tokugawa government established a maximum interest 
rate of 20% per annum with criminal penalties assessed on rates over 30%,31 
and for pawnbrokers a graduated scale from 36% to 20% decreasing with the 
size of the loan.32  They fiddled with those numbers incessantly, capping 
interest rates at one point at 5%, at another point declaring the “proper rate” 
15%, and later 12%.33  The government would also ex post adjust interest 
rates.34  In 1729, it reduced interest rate charges to 5% on all outstanding 
loans concluded between 1702 and 1729, noting that after the recoinage of 
gold and silver in the Genroku Period (1688-1704) the price of grain 
advanced considerably and then fell, but “the interest on loans and pledges 
remains the same as before, to the great embarrassment of the people.”35 
Despite considerable barriers to litigation,36 cases relating to money 
lending were widely adjudicated and the procedures for such suits well 
                                           
28
  See id. 
29
  ONO, supra note 22, at 208. 
30
  At the same time, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Sir William Blackstone were writing in 
defense of usury and England was moving towards the abolition of its usury laws.  See Carl F. Taeusch, 
The Concept of “Usury” the History of an Idea, 3 J. HIST. IDEAS 291, 306, 310 (1942).  See also 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *454-56. 
31
  Nishimura Nobuo, Shin Risoku Seigenhō Hihan (1), 29 MINSHŌHŌ ZASSHI (No. 6) 387, 389 
(1954); ONO, supra note 22, at 201. 
32
  In 1692, the Tokugawa Shogunate promulgated regulations for pawnbrokers restricting interest 
rates to 36% for loans up to 100 mon, 28% for loans under 2 ryō; 24% for loans under 10 ryō; 20% for 
loans up to 100 ryō; and less than 20% for loans over 100 ryō.  Nishimura, supra note 31, at 398. 
33
  See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 256-62; 333-34; Nishimura, supra note 31, at 398. 
34
  See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 256, 259.  
35
  Id. at 256. 
36
  Apart from the “didactic conciliation” mandated by the Tokugawa authorities and documented by 
Professor Henderson, Professor Wigmore notes “one of the reasons why the mercantile classes resorted so 
little to the courts in their disputes was the necessity of humiliating themselves so deeply in their quest for 
justice—of crawling, for instance, on hands and knees from the door of the court to the judgment room.”  1 
WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 41.  See also DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: 
TOKUGAWA AND MODERN (1965). 
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established.37  The numbers, however, periodically threatened to overwhelm 
the courts.  At one point, the Chamber of Decisions, Tokugawa Japan’s 
highest court, complained that money actions have “increased to such an 
extent that, if we are to try all of them, as we do now, the court days of the 
Chamber . . . will be occupied with those actions exclusively . . . [and] the 
morale of the Chamber may degenerate.”38  No self-respecting samurai-
magistrate could tolerate listening to money suits all day, and the Council of 
State responded by limiting the dates on which money suits would be 
heard.39 
The magistrates also sought to limit practice before the courts by 
creditors, citing “many vicious practices”:  
[T]he creditor sometimes sends to court some person skilled in 
litigation [to represent him], pretending that this man is his 
dependent relative or servant. . . . Again, some instigate 
unfounded suits for some petty arrearage against country 
people, knowing that the latter, even when they have no 
recollection of the claim, would rather pay some proportion of 
it in settlement than undertake the expense of coming to the city 
to defend the suit.  Moreover, we hear that sometimes a person 
takes advantage of the poverty or ignorance of another, and in 
lending him money takes an instrument of land pledge, 
stipulating usurious interest, and afterwards alters the 
arrangement into a contract of renting.40 
The magistrates argued and the Council of State agreed that this conduct—
skilled representation, extorted settlements, and fraud—could not be stopped 
absent penalty.  They proposed that a litigant falsely putting forward a 
person skilled in litigation be punished.41 
The Chamber of Decisions employed other means to regulate actions 
involving the lending of money at interest.  It periodically dismissed all of 
them.42  It issued “private settlement orders” in 1719 and again in 1797, 
noting in the latter that borrowing money “originates as a matter of private 
arrangement between the parties, and hence there is no necessity for 
                                           
37
  See CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868, 108-19, 147 (1991); 3 
WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 7-8, 43-47. 
38
  3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 54.   
39
  The negative response to this kind of suit was “[a] not unnatural notion of samurai.”  Id. at 54 n.6. 
40
  Id. at 19. 
41
  See id. 
42
  See id. at 1-2.   
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undertaking and judging disputes of that sort.”43  Actions on money suits 
“must necessarily mean lack of sincerity in both the borrower and lender.” 44  
Orders stipulated that the parties were to carry out their obligations with a 
“true sense of their mutual duties,” and those who did not would be 
“punished severely.”45 
The Tokugawa rulers were aware of the consequences of intervention.  
In 1842, a town magistrate argued that “the failure of debtors to repay their 
borrowings has recently become so frequent that . . . the circulation of 
money is at present very sluggish.”46  The magistrate argued that private 
settlement orders “injuriously affected” money circulation and caused men 
to become “more and more self-willed and shameless,” borrowing money 
with the intent to delay payment.47  “In seeking to cure these evils and that of 
the inactive circulation of money,” reform of the laws was necessary “so as 
to facilitate legal proceedings as much as possible and give the creditor a 
guarantee that he shall obtain satisfaction without fail.”48 
In 1843, the Council of State adopted regulations to do just that, 
providing for regular court hearings and imprisonment for failure to pay, 
execution of property and liability for any remaining debts, penalties for 
secreting property, and no statute of limitations.49  In less than a year, 
however, the Council again dismissed all money suits, deciding that “out of 
compassion” for the heavy debt loads and “unfortunate condition” of 
numerous families of the military gentry they would change the 
regulations.50  The Tokugawa government again dismissed all pending 
money suits.51  Interest rates remained capped at 12% per annum until the 
beginning of the Meji Reformation.52 
B. The Meiji, Taisho, and Pre-World War II Showa Eras 
The Meiji Reformation brought major changes.  After a brief civil 
war, the Tokugawa government fell, and, on January 3, 1868, the Meiji 
Emperor was “restored.”53  The Meiji government initially decreed that the 
                                           
43
  Id. at 1-3, 324-25. 
44
  Id. 
45
  Id. at 324-25, 334. 
46
  Id. at 321-23. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id. 
49
  Id. at 323-47; ONO, supra note 22, at 214. 
50
  3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 333-34. 
51
  Id. 
52
  Id.; ONO, supra note 22, at 201. 
53
  MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 61 (2d ed. 2002).  Scholars suggest the Meiji 
Restoration came about “as a unifying political force through the inter-related political processes of ‘revival 
JUNE 2008 JAPAN AND THE MONEYLENDERS 537 
  
Tokugawa era laws would continue to apply.54  However, in 1871 the Great 
Council of State (dajōkan), an institution surviving from the imperial court,55 
issued Order No. 31, abolishing Tokugawa usury restrictions and declaring 
that, henceforth, parties to a civil contract were free to set their own interest 
rates.56   
This freedom was short-lived.57  In 1877, the Meiji government 
reintroduced comprehensive interest rate restrictions, albeit without any 
criminal penalties.58  By Order No. 66, the Council promulgated the Interest 
Rate Restriction Act (“Meiji IRRA”) and, in doing so, established a 
regulatory paradigm that continues today.59  Article 1 divided interest rates 
on money loans into those established by law and those established by 
contract.60  For the latter, Article 2 permitted interest rates up to 20% per 
annum on loans under ¥100, up to 15% on loans between ¥100 and ¥1000, 
and up to 12% on loans over ¥1000.  Interest payments in excess of these 
limits were “void before the court” (saiban jo mukō).61  Interest otherwise 
denominated, including “appreciation fees” and “thanks money,” were “void 
before the court.”62  Liquidated damages provisions were subject to 
reduction by the court to reflect actual damages.63 
Debate regarding freedom of contract lasted longer.  The French legal 
scholar Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie arrived in Japan in 1873,64 
and his draft of the Civil Code specifically contemplated interest rate 
restrictions.65  The Codification Investigation Committee’s debate over 
Boissonade’s draft in toto was perfunctory, but debate over his interest rate 
                                                                                                                              
of monarchal government’ (ōsei fukkō), ‘return of the people and land to the emperor’ (hanseki hōkan), and 
‘abolition of fiefs and establishment of prefectures’ (haihan chiken).”  Ken Mukai & Nobuyoshi Toshitani, 
The Progress and Problems of Compiling the Civil Code in the Early Meiji Era, in 1 LAW IN JAPAN 25, 31 
(Dan Fenno Henderson trans., 1967). 
54
  ONO, supra note 22, at 202-03 (quoting Minbukan Futatsu No. 506 of June 4, 1869).  
55
  Mukai & Toshitani, supra note 53, at 28 note c. 
56
  ONO, supra note 22, at 203 (quoting Dajōkan Fukoku No. 31 of Jan. 18, 1871); Nishimura, supra 
note 31, at 389. 
57
  Nishimura, supra note 31, at 389. 
58
  Id. at 389, 391.  For further discussion of law without sanctions in Japan, see John O. Haley, 
Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265, 
272 (1982). 
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provision lasted for two days.66  Opponents argued that Boissonade’s draft 
was paternalistic and counter to the philosophy of freedom of contract that 
underlay the new Civil Code; it would restrict finance and harm borrowers.67  
In the end, both the 1890 Civil Code first promulgated and the 1896 Civil 
Code later adopted offered the exact opposite of Boissonade’s draft.68  The 
parties were free to establish interest rates in excess of the default rate by 
agreement, and remedies in the case of any illegal charges were limited to a 
refusal to pay the same.69  Opponents of Boissonade’s draft followed this 
victory with proposals in May and June 1895 to abolish the Meiji IRRA, but 
were unsuccessful.70  The Civil Code, as revised, and the Meiji IRRA, as 
earlier established, represented a compromise.71  The result is that the 
current Civil Code provides a general rule of freedom of contract, 
establishes a legal interest rate that acts as a default, and is silent with regard 
to interest rate restrictions.72  The current IRRA operates as a special law 
within this framework.73 
This tension between a newly espoused freedom of contract and 
legislative restrictions on money lending was reflected in the judicial 
decisions of the imperial courts.  The issue that confronted the Tokugawa 
magistrates, whether to allow the parties to structure their own transactions 
or interfere, remained, but the judicial decisions now reflected a distinct bias 
towards the former.  The Great Court of Cassation, a high court based on the 
French model established in 1875,74 applied the Meiji IRRA where 
necessary and limited its application where possible. 
The court early on addressed whether interest rate restrictions were 
applicable to non-monetary loans, and it repeatedly said no.75  Courts began 
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  Id. at 218. 
67
  Id.; Ōkawa Sumio, Meiji Minpō no Hensan to Risoku Seigen Hō, 6 RITSUMEIKAN RONSHŪ 102, 
103, 112 (2003). 
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  For an explanation of the Civil Code controversy, see JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT 
POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 75-77 (1991); Mukai & Toshitani, supra note 53, at 25; 
Richard W. Rabinowitz, Law and the Social Process in Japan, 10 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY 
OF JAPAN  (3d Series) 11 (1968). 
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  ONO, supra note 22, at 218.   
70
  Id. at 219, 230.  Opponents of the law called it an “empty act” (tohō) at odds with basic economics 
and the evolution of law from restriction to freedom.  Proponents argued the law remained necessary 
providing a remedy, at the court’s discretion, for immoral behavior.  See Ōkawa, supra note 67, at 104-05, 
111. 
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  ONO, supra note 22, at 219, 230.  
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  Id. at 221. 
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  Id. 
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  HALEY, supra note 68, at 69. 
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  4 DAIHAN MINROKU 30 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Feb. 17, 1898); 9 DAIHAN MINROKU 101 (Great 
Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 22, 1901); 13 DAIHAN MINROKU 716 (Great Ct. of Cassation, June 26, 1907); 27 
DAIHAN MINROKU 939 (Great Ct. of Cassation May 18, 1921); Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391. 
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emphasizing that the law was “in contravention of the principle of freedom 
of contract,” and though perhaps necessary to prevent harm arising from 
unreasonable profits, not to be expanded.76  When the courts found the 
statute applicable, they were required to interpret the “void before the 
courts” language in Article 2, and refused to enforce lenders’ claims to 
excessive interest charges not yet paid.77  At the same time, they rejected 
borrowers’ claims for refund of excessive interest paid so long as it was 
“voluntarily paid.”78  Other courts focused on the agreement of the parties 
with the same result.  According to a 1909 decision, if “it had been paid 
based on the agreement of the parties,” it was not amenable to a claim for 
refund.79  If a contract calling for illegal interest was made and illegal 
interest voluntarily paid, then it was not only the creditor but also the debtor 
who had engaged in an illegal act.80 
In 1919, with the end of World War I and poor economic conditions,81 
the government lowered the maximum interest rate in the Meiji IRRA to 
15%.82  Yet the courts continued to conservatively interpret the act.  In a 
1921 case, the court affirmed, where the debtor has agreed to pay “without 
any reservation . . . they cannot demand the return of the payment made in 
excess.”83  The courts would closely examine whether at the time of 
payment the party “registered any objection” to the usurious interest rate.84  
Debtors routinely made the argument that interest rates in excess of the caps 
were void as against public policy, and the courts routinely rejected it.85  In 
the absence of inappropriate or “cruel circumstances,” such contracts could 
exist within the “range of the freedom of contract.”86 
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  24 DAIHAN MINROKU 67 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Jan. 28, 1918).  See also ONO, supra note 22, at 
242. 
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  Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391; Ōkawa, supra note 67, at 102, 103. 
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  Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391; Ōkawa, supra note 67, at 102, 103. 
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  15 DAIHAN MINROKU 649 (Great Ct. of Cassation, July 3, 1909).  See also ONO, supra note 22, at 
248. 
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  8 DAIHAN MINROKU 134 (Great Ct. of Cassation Oct. 25, 1902).   
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  Risoku Seigen Mondō, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Mar. 15, 1919, at 2. 
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  See Risoku Seigenhō [Interest Rate Restriction Act (Amendment)], Law No. 59 of 1919.  See also 
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 397; ONO, supra note 22, at 221.  The Diet reduced the top rate to 15% on 
loans below ¥100, 12% on loans between ¥100 and ¥1000, and 10% on loans over ¥1000.  ONO, supra note 
22, at 221.   
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  27 DAIHAN MINROKU 475 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Mar. 5, 1920).  See also ONO, supra note 22, at 
254. 
84
  ONO, supra note 22, at 255-57. 
85
  3281 HŌRITSU SHINBUN 9 (Great Ct. of Cassation, May 23, 1931); 4 HŌGAKU 1568 (Great Ct. of 
Cassation, Apr. 26, 1935).  See also ONO, supra note 22, at 290-91.   
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  10 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 69 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Feb. 13, 1931); ONO, supra note 22, at 255, 290-
91. 
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While courts were loath to expand the scope of the law, as with the 
Tokugawa courts, they did not countenance attempts to circumvent it.  The 
statute is silent as to discounted interest, defined as prepaid interest 
subtracted from the loan proceeds provided to the debtor.87  Where the 
borrower received ¥1480 on a loan of ¥4300, the Court of Cassation found 
the borrower received an economic benefit from only the money received 
and, as a result, no contractual debt arose with regard to the deducted interest 
and fees.88  Subsequent courts agreed explaining that to hold otherwise 
“would allow evasion” of the Meiji IRRA.89  The courts had little difficulty 
reaching a similar conclusion regarding “compensation fees” paid for loans, 
deeming them construed interest.90  Investigative fees which were in reality 
“means by the creditor to obtain monetary profits in excess of the interest 
rate restrictions” were also “void before the court.”91 
Scholars have argued the courts’ focus on the agreement of the parties 
and voluntary payment literally took the teeth out of the law.92  These cases 
suggest the courts were not willing to countenance creditors evading the 
statute, but they were not willing to extend the protection of the statute 
further. 
C. The Post-World War II Showa and Heisei Eras 
World War II brought substantial changes to the money lending 
industry.  In 1939, the Diet adopted the Finance Industry Control Regulation 
which, under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Department, created 
a licensing system for the lending industry, prohibited misleading 
advertising, and required written loan contracts.93  In the midst of the turmoil 
and high interest rates after the war, the new government issued a Price 
Control Order in 1946 and adopted the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment 
Act in 1947.94  The former prohibited excessive profits.95  The latter allowed 
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  Meiji IRRA, supra note 59. 
88
  9 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 49 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Jan. 28, 1930).  
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  10 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 1159 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Dec. 3, 1931); 14 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 1211 (Great 
Ct. of Cassation, May 8, 1935).  See also ONO, supra note 22, at 265-66.  
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at 266. 
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  15 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 1843 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 23, 1936).  See also ONO, supra note 22, at 
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  Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391. 
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  Kinyūgyō Torshimari Kisoku [Financial Industry Regulation], Metropolitan Police Order No. 29 
of 1939; ONO, supra note 22, at 221. 
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  Bukka Tōsei Rei [Price Control Order], Order No. 118 of 1946, available at http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/htmldata/S21/S21CO118.html (last visted at Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Price Control Order]; 
Rinji Kinri Chōseihō [Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Act], Law No. 181 of 1947, available at 
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the Minister of Finance to establish a Japan Banking Policy Committee to 
set maximum interest rates that varied by region and type of financial 
institution.96 
The government followed with the Money Lending Industry Self 
Regulation Development Act which established local self regulatory 
organizations.97  Membership, however, was voluntary and less than 10% of 
the registered money lenders joined.98  In response, the government enacted 
in 1949 the Money Lending Industry Control Act.99  This new law required 
advance registration by commercial money lenders with the Ministry of 
Finance and the submission of business practice reports detailing interest 
rates charges.100  If those interest rates rates exceeded 50 sen per day, the 
Ministry of Finance routinely rejected the report and, in doing so, attemped 
to impose a de facto interest rate cap of 182.5% per annum.101 
Interest rates rose rapidly during the period from 1946 through 1949, 
from approximately 50% to over 200%.102  They were followed by “the 
Dodge Line,” harsh anti-inflationary measures drafted by Joseph Dodge, 
economic advisor to Supreme Commander of Allied Powers.103  Deflation 
and recession followed, businesses were forced into bankruptcy, 
unemployment increased, and workers went on strike protesting layoffs at 
Japan Steelworks, Toshiba, and other major companies.104  Letters to the 
legal advice columnist of the Yomiuri Newspaper touched repeatedly on 
borrowing money.105 
                                                                                                                              
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S22/S22HO181.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Temporary 
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YOMIURI SHINBUN, Dec. 8, 1948, at 2; Hōritsu Sōdan: Kōrikashi Kara no Shakkin Kashikin to Kaisha no 
Hasan, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Apr. 8, 1950, at 3; Hōritsu Sōdan: Shakkin no Kinri shinhōritsu ni Yoru Katei 
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In 1954, the Diet responded with a new Interest Rate Restriction Act 
(“IRRA”)106 as well as the Acceptance of Investment, Money Deposits and 
Interest Rates Regulation Act (“Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates 
Act”).107  Both were aimed at what the newspapers described as “street 
finance companies” and “vague moneylenders” that had arisen in the 
aftermath of World War II.108  Both laws continue to govern the consumer 
finance industry in Japan today.   
The latter, as its unwieldy title suggests, sought to regulate three 
separate areas of finance.  It restricted the acceptance of investments and 
money deposits to licensed financial institutions.109  The law offered a direct 
response to the upheaval caused by postwar pyramid schemes such as the 
“Conservation Economics Club,” which offered a five year, ¥2 million 
return on an investment of ¥10,000 and gathered 15,000 investors and ¥450 
million before filing for bankruptcy.110 
With regard to interest rates, it capped them as well as brokerage 
commissions on loans.111  Article 4 capped commissions at 5% of the loan 
amount and deemed any money received by a broker “to be a commission 
regardless of its designation.”112  The new act added criminal penalties to 
lending money at usurious rates.  Article 5 provided for imprisonment up to 
three years and/or a fine up to ¥3 million for lending rates in excess of 30 
sen per day, or 109.5% per year.113 
The new IRRA revised the private law restrictions.  The Ministry of 
Justice explained that, given currency values, continued application of the 
Meiji era interest rate and yen range structure would be “remarkably 
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gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO100.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter IRRA].  The new law 
came into effect June 15, 1954, abolishing and replacing the Meiji IRRA.  Id. supp. provision 1-2, 
translated in [STATUTE VOL.] DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. 4, at app. 4B-2 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2007). 
107
 Shusshi no Ukeire, Azukarikin oyobi Kinri nado no Torishimari ni kansuru Hōritsu [Acceptance 
of Investments, Money Deposits and Interest Rates Regulation Act], Law No. 195 of 1954 [hereinafter 
Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act].  The law abolished its predecessor, the Money Lending 
Industry Self Regulation Development Act No. 170 of 1949.  See Shusshihō available at http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO195.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
108
  Machi no Kinyū Torishimarihō Kokkai he Teishutsu, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Mar. 2, 1954, at 3; 
Seiritsu Shita Shuyō Keizai Hōritsu, YOMIURI SHINBUN, June 5, 1954 at 4. 
109
  Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act, supra note 107, arts. 1-2.  The Law also prohibited 
loans made by employees of financial institutions for the benefit of themselves or a third party other than 
the financial institution.  Id. art. 3. 
110
  The “Conservation Economics Club” prompted calls for new regulation and a fraud conviction for 
its managers.  Kimura Mitsue, Shusshihō to Shōhisha Hogo, 240 HŌGAKU KYŌSHITSU 16 (2000). 
111
  Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act, supra note 107, art. 4 
112
  Id.  
113
  Id. art. 5. 















Gray Zone Lending After 1954 
irrational” and contribute to a tendency for the law to be ignored.114  The 
new IRRA increased the ceilings on the three interest rate caps, and it 
explicitly incorporated the exception recognized by the pre-war judiciary 
validating “voluntary” payment of interest in excess of the caps.115 
Article 1 of the 1954 IRRA capped maximum interest rates where the 
principal is less than ¥100,000 at 20% per annum; where the principal is 
between ¥100,000 and ¥1 million at 18%; and where the principal is ¥1 
million or more at 15%.116  “The agreement on interest shall be null and void 
with regard to the portion which is in excess.”117  Pursuant to Paragraph 2, 
however, “where the debtor has voluntarily paid a portion in excess . . . he 
may not demand the refund thereof.”118  Scholars argued the revisions 
should have been limited to adjusting the limits to account for the new 
currency values.119 
The gap between the top 
20% civil cap and 109.5% 
criminal cap left plenty of 
room for “voluntary 
payments.”120  Consumer 
finance companies, not 
surprisingly, lent money at 
rates within this range, in a 
practice that came to be 
known as “gray zone 
lending.”121 
The statute also 
explicitly addressed 
“discounted interest” and 
“construed interest.”  Discounted interest or prepaid interest “shall be 
deemed to have been allocated to the payment of the principal.”122  Money 
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received by the creditor in connection with the loan, other than for principal 
or expenses “in concluding the contract” or “performing obligation-duties,” 
will be deemed interest regardless of whether construed as an investigation 
fee, discount charge, commission, or other.123  Finally, the new statute 
restricted the liquidated damages permitted in a loan to no more than two 
times the rates prescribed in Article 1.124 
The Diet, in effect, incorporated the prewar holdings of the Great 
Court of Cassation that defined “discounted interest” and “construed 
interest,” as well as the early court doctrine regarding payments “voluntarily 
made.”  The latter doctrine, now statutory law, continued to significantly 
limit the substantive effect of the statute.125 
The new Japanese Supreme Court made few changes.  In a 1955 
decision, it reviewed illegal interest rate charges of 120% and found: 
It goes without saying that a creditor cannot demand payment 
of contractually designated interest in excess of any interest 
rates provided in the [IRRA] in an action at law.  However, with 
regard to the portion already paid without objection by the 
debtor, one cannot make claims for repayment of this amount, 
or claim that the apportionment of this payment was 
inappropriate.126 
The Supreme Court found that such interest rates were not, despite the 
IRRA, ipso facto void as against public policy.  To find a violation of Article 
90 of the Civil Code required “special circumstances” where the lender took 
advantage of a borrower who “was in dire straits, rash, or inexperienced in 
order to gain strikingly excessive profits.”127 
The lower courts were less constrained.  While prewar cases focused 
on the statutory language “void before the court,” postwar courts quickly 
focused on the language “voluntarily paid.”  Postwar courts split with regard 
to whether payments voluntarily made in excess of the interest-rate caps 
should be applied to the remaining principal of the loan.  Some courts said 
no, including a 1955 Sapporo High Court decision that foreclosed on the 
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  11 MINROKU (No. 9) 1479 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 5, 1957), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
hanrei/pdf/36E79C2819B11F8249256A8500316450.pdf. 
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borrower’s ST deluxe men’s bicycle.128  Others said yes, finding that any 
interest payments in excess of the caps, voluntary or not, should be applied 
to the remaining principal.129  These courts found the payments similar to 
prepayment of interest, which pursuant to Article 2 reduced the amount of 
principal; they focused on the intent of the statute to “protect the 
economically disadvantaged borrower.”130   
The Supreme Court followed, slowly.  In a May 1962 decision, it 
overturned a lower court applying liquidated damages that exceeded the 
interest rate caps to the principal of the loan.131  The Court found the 
contractual provision void and the voluntary payment made on a “non-debt,” 
but it held that the borrower was not permitted to demand application of the 
excess payments to the remaining principal of the loan, because this “would 
have the same economic effect as receiving a refund.”132  Even if the intent 
of the statute was to “protect the economically disadvantaged borrower from 
usurious financing rates,” applying excess interest payments to the principal 
of the loan in this case would “give rise to a remarkable inequality of 
treatment” with those for whom no principal remained.133 
In the next two years, ten new members were appointed to the 
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court changed its mind.134  In 1964, the 
Supreme Court sitting en banc handed down a decision that scholars hailed 
as the beginning of a newly assertive Supreme Court.135  The defendant had 
borrowed at interest rates up to 36% and argued that the payments made in 
excess of the statutory caps should be applied to the principal.136  The 
arguments were familiar, and the lower courts declined to do so.  The 
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Supreme Court acknowledged its earlier decisions, but now found that 
“when the borrower has voluntarily paid interest and liquidated damages on 
a cash-based consumption loan contract in excess of the restrictions” that 
portion should be applied to the remaining principal.  The Court found 
Article 1 was a mandatory provision and any excess interest rate charges 
“void”: 
As a result, even where a borrower makes payment designating 
it as payment of interest and liquidated damages, with regard to 
the excess portion, that designation is without meaning, and, as 
a result, it is treated as if there was no designation at all.137 
Where unpaid principal remained, now, pursuant to the default provisions of 
the Civil Code, excess interest would be applied to that principal.138  Where 
earlier courts searched for the parties’ intent, now, that intent “is without 
meaning” and “treated as if there was no designation.”139 
For the first time, the Supreme Court prioritized consumer protection:  
“interpreting the debtor’s voluntary payment of amounts in excess of the 
restrictions as payment towards the remaining principal comports with the 
primary legislative intent of the law to protect the borrower who occupies an 
economically disadvantaged position.”140  Any other interpretation justified 
by an inequality of result would “abandon the protection of borrowers with 
principal outstanding and violate the legislative spirit of this law.”141 
The Court’s concern with unequal treatment of borrowers was short-
lived.  Four years later, the Supreme Court explicitly allowed claims for 
refund.142  Plaintiff had borrowed at an interest rate of 84%, defaulted, and 
the defendant foreclosed on property pledged as collateral.  The plaintiff 
sued for return of the property and a refund of interest and penalties paid.  
The lower court refused to award damages, but the Supreme Court reversed: 
[W]hen a borrower has voluntarily paid interest or liquidated 
damages in excess of the law’s designated interest rates, a 
demand for the refund of that excess portion cannot be made.  
However, this provision is, as a matter of course, premised on 
principal existing on a cash-based consumption loan.  Where 
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principal on the loan does not exist, it cannot give rise to 
interest or liquidated damages, and, as a result, it is not possible 
for there to be an excess payment of interest or liquidated 
damages.143   
In other words, where the principal had been paid and the borrower 
continued to voluntarily pay interest and liquidated damages, the payment is 
made on a “non-debt,” the IRRA is not applicable, and “a claim for 
repayment based on unjust enrichment will be recognized.”144  Scholars 
argued that the Supreme Court had engaged in “judicial legislation” 
declaring paragraph 2 of Articles 1 and 4 of the IRRA deadletter.145  They 
called the decision “groundbreaking” and a clear attempt at “social ordering” 
by the Supreme Court.146 
Throughout the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s, the courts 
repeatedly upheld borrower’s claims for unjust enrichment and awarded 
damages refunding gray zone interest rates charges.  In their decisions, the 
courts continued to emphasize the inequality between the creditor and 
borrower, focus on substance over form, and ignore the parties’ stated 
intent.147 
A second 1968 Supreme Court decision illustrates their willingness to 
ignore the plain language of the contract.148  The parties had entered into 
multiple loan contracts and contractually designated the apportionment and 
order of payment, but the court found: “with regard to . . . the amount in 
excess of the restrictions for which no obligation exists, that agreement is 
meaningless.”149  At this point, the Court was willing to flatly ignore the 
explicit intent of the parties.  It addressed the issue sua sponte, as “a legal 
issue,” finding no need to wait for argument or special pleading from the 
parties.150 
A 1977 Supreme Court decision illustrates their interest in substance 
over form.151  The Court found the lender lent ¥11.5 million to a borrower 
                                           
143
  Id. 
144
  Id. 
145
  Awaji, supra note 134, at 10, 13-14. 
146
  Id. 
147
  23 MINSHŪ 2137 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1969), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/ 
pdf/C0F5BC0BF304870C49256A850031228D.pdf; 24 MINSHŪ 298 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 21, 1970), available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/5C454C208038E7F149256A8500312269.pdf. 
148
  22 MINSHŪ (No. 10) 2257 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 29, 1968), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/ 
pdf/644EF2748FEC1ADC49256A8500312318.pdf. 
149
  Id. 
150
  Id. 
151
  31 MINSHŪ (No. 4) 449 (Sup. Ct., June 20, 1977), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/ 
pdf/CA1573B0BBD85C4949256A8500312086.pdf. 
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but required the borrower maintain ¥6 million on deposit.  In doing so, the 
lender violated Article 19 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act and 
“engaged in an unfair business practice.”152  The Supreme Court found “in 
reality” a loan to “the economically vulnerable appellant” of no more than 
¥5.5 million and recalculated interest charges based on this, subject to the 
restrictions set out in the IRRA.153  
With these decisions, the Supreme Court began to enforce a 
“legislative intent” to protect the borrower and, in doing so, to ignore the 
parties’ stated intent.  Along the way, they invalidated the “voluntary 
payment” sections of the IRRA.154  According to one practitioner, after 1964, 
the Supreme Court came to “prioritize the objective application” of the 
Act.155   
The decisions did little though to stem growing problems, widely 
reported in Japanese newspapers, with the burgeoning consumer finance 
industry.  With banks focused on secured business loans and uninterested in 
unsecured consumer loans, consumer finance companies started cropping up 
in the 1950s and increased rapidly in the 1960s. 156  Sara-kin, an abbreviation 
for “salaryman financing” or unsecured consumer loans, continued to grow 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s.157  Finance companies introduced 
automatic teller machines (“ATM”) to dispense cash loans to registered 
users.158  “One call lending” allowed new borrowers to complete loans over 
the telephone and have the money transferred to the customer’s bank 
account the same day.159  New ATMs followed that could screen new 
borrowers allowing them to borrow any time of the day or night, without the 
                                           
152
  Id.  According to Article 19 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act, “No 
entrepreneur shall engage in unfair business practices.” Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kōsei Torihiki no 
Kakuo ni kansuro Hōritsu [Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act], Law No. 23 of 2003, art. 19, 
translated in [STATUTE VOL.] DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. 7, at app. 7A-23 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1999). 
153
  31 MINSHŪ (No. 4) 449 (Sup. Ct., June 20, 1977), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/search/ 
jhsp0010?action_id=first&hanreiSrchKbn=02.   
154
  ONO, supra note 22, at 284. 
155
  Chihara Yōko, Saikōsaibanrei no Kiseki Seiri, 1106 HANREI TAIMUZU 14, 16 (2002). 
156
  Terada, supra note 26; Bōri Sarakin Yurusanu, Kisei Hōan Konkokkai ni Teishutsu he Yoyatō 
Gōi—Jōgen Kinri Dankai Sage, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Mar. 20, 1982, at 7; Bōryoku Toritate ha Haijo—Tōnai 
no Kashikingyōsha, Jishu Kisei Tsukuru, NIKKEI, Apr. 9, 1982, at 23; Kaho Shimizu & Mayumi Negishi, 
Aggressive TV Commercials Paid Off—Perhaps Too Much, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 18, 2006. 
157
  Shōhisha Kinyū Shinyō Kyōyo Zandaka (Shōwa 56–Heisei 14), available at 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/14.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); Zaimukyoku Kankei no Kinyū 
Kikan, available at http://www.mof.go.jp/zaimu/50nenn/020402.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
158
  Shōhisha Kinyū Kakusha, Madoguchi Kikaika Rasshu—CD·ATM o Shinzōsetsu, Raishun 200 Dai 
Taisei, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, Apr. 22, 1982, at 12. 
159
  Denwa Ippon De Sugu Yūshi—Shinshu no Sarakin Hirogaru Ippō, Ukeru Tegarusa, Higeki mo 
Fueru, NIKKEI (Nishibu Chōkan), Apr. 9, 1983, at 17. 
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embarrassment or inconvenience of going to a finance company.160  
Consumer loans up to ¥300,000 required only an identification card and self-
declaration of income.161 
Along with easy credit came harsh collection tactics.162  In 1976, the 
National Police Agency took the unusual step of publicly requesting the 
Ministry of Finance investigate and adopt regulatory measures to address the 
problems associated with the economic downturn in the 1970s and bad-faith, 
high interest lending practices.163  Consumer interest groups formed to 
advocate legislative reform.164  Local bar associations formed study 
groups,165 and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations proposed 
legislation.166  Opposition parties submitted bills in the Diet to regulate the 
industry.167 
Newspapers, even the conservative Nihon Keizei Shinbun, began 
publishing accounts of sara-kin financing destroying families; overwhelmed 
borrowers fleeing their homes; borrowers committing suicide; borrowers 
killing their children and themselves; housewives arrested for burglarizing 
department stores to repay consumer debt; and debtors setting fire to their 
homes to collect the insurance and repay consumer loans.168  Of the fifty-
four debt-related suicides recorded in Fukuoka Prefecture in 1982, 
                                           
160
  See Shimizu & Negishi, supra note 156; see also Nakamura & Negishi, supra note 11.   
161
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 16.  Unsecured loans are generally offered for individuals in 
amounts up to ¥300,000 and for small businesses in amounts up to ¥500,000.  The terms of the loan vary, 
but are often advertised as ranging from one month to five years, payment by monthly installment.  All 
contain acceleration clauses and liquidated damages; many require a guarantor.  See, e.g., Promise, Shōhin 
Naiyō, Kaiin Kiyaku, https://cyber.promise.co.jp/Pcmain;jsessionid=0001Tr8toqbPA6lcTkbVBzT8Q6G:2 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2007); Acom, AC Kain Kiyaku, Kashitsuke Jōken Hyō, 
http://pr.acom.jp/def/?p1=afvc003 (last visited Apr. 30, 2007); Takefuji, ¥Shop, http://www.takefuji.co.jp/ 
shop/karitai/ad693_main.html?ad=p000693%83g%83%89%83t%83B%83b%83N%83Q%81%5B%83g 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2007). 
162
  Bōri Sarakin Yurusanu, Kisei Hōan Konkokkai ni Teishutsu he Yoyatō Gōi—Jōgen Kinri Dankai 
Sage, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Mar. 20, 1982, at 7; Bōryoku Toritate ha Haijo—Tōnai no Kashikingyōsha, Jishu 
Kisei Tsukuru, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 9, 1982, at 23. 
163
  Akushitsu Sarakin, Hōchi Dekinu—Keisatsuchō, Ōkurashō ni Kisei Kyōka Yōsei, NIKKEI 
(Chōkan), Dec. 22, 1976, at 19. 
164
  Shōhisha Kinyū Kyōkai, Sarakin Riyōsha Hogo ni Kujōshorii nado Setchi, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), 
Dec. 29, 1976, at 8. 
165
  Ōsaka Bengoshikai, Sarakin Mondai o Kenkyū—Hōsei no Shian Tsukuri he, NIHON KEIZAI 
SANGYŌ SHINBUN, July 28, 1977, at 9. 
166
  Sarakin, Nichibenren ga Kiseian—Menkyōsei Dōnyū ya Rishi Seigen, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), Aug. 3, 
1978, at 22.  
167
  “Sarakin” Hōkisei no Ugoki - Eigyō Teishi nado Gyōsei Kainyū, Kōmeitō, Konkokkai ni 
Hōanteishutsu, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), May 7, 1977, at 6. 
168
  Kokumin Seikatsu Shinbukai, Sarakin Kisei de Chūkan Hōkoku—Shōhisha Shinyō Hogohō o, 
Kōkinri nado Hadome, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Sept. 9, 1978, at 22; Keishichō, Nenmatsu Hikae Akushitsu Kinyū 
34 Gyōsha Tekihatsu, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Nov. 27, 1981, at 15; Okūsan, Otonari Made Sarakin Higeki ga –
Kigaruni Karishimi ni, NIKKEI (Nagoya Chōkan), Apr. 4, 1983, at 21; Sarakingyōhō no Settei o Isoge, 
NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 9, 1983, at 2. 
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approximately 80% were attributed to problems with sara-kin.169  The police 
made mass arrests of lenders violating the law and pointed to links to 
organized crime.170  The stories of “debtor’s hell” and “salaryman finance 
tragedies” mounted and so did the pressure on the Japanese government to 
act.  
In 1978, as discussions between the ministries over a regulatory 
framework dragged on, the Ministry of Finance worked on a bill that would 
cut the then current public law caps of 109.5%.171  They issued 
administrative guidance to the Japanese Federation of Consumer Finance 
Associations to clarify interest disclosures and begin providing detailed 
receipts.172  The Prime Minister followed, directing the administrative 
agencies to submit to the next session of Diet a comprehensive legislative 
proposal. 173  In two months, the Ministry of Finance had draft legislation 
that created a licensing system for lenders, reduced maximum interest rates, 
and added administrative oversight.174   
The bill was never submitted to the Diet.175  LDP proposals barred 
borrower claims for refund of interest charges in excess of the IRRA caps 
where “the borrower paid the interest voluntarily,” an addition reversing the 
Supreme Court and strongly opposed by the opposition parties.176  The 
LDP’s legislation “miscarried” in 1979, and again in 1980, 1981, and 
1982.177  Over the course of eight sessions of parliament, bills were 
                                           
169
  Sarakin Higeki, Yūkōgata kara Seikatsugata he—Kyūshū Kakuchi de Kensū Kyūzō, Hōritsu Sōdan 
3 Wari, NIKKEI (Nishibu Chōkan), Apr. 16, 1983, at 17. 
170
  Keishichō, Akushitsu Sarakin 25 sha Tekihatsu—Mise no Shina Katte ni Shobun no Rei mo, 
NIKKEI (Yūkan), Nov. 25, 1978, at 11; Keishichō, Nenmatsu Hikae Akushitsu Kinyū 34 Gyōsha Tekihatsu, 
NIKKEI (Yūkan), Nov. 27, 1981, at 15; Tōkyō·Himonyasho, Geppu Hanbaiten Kara 2 Okuen Sashu no 
Shufu Guru-pu o Taihō—Sarakin no Hensai ni Komari, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Feb. 24, 1982, at 15. 
171
  Ōkurashō, Sarakin Kisei he Hōritsu Kaisei o Kentou—Kinri no Jōgen wo Hanbun ni?, NIKKEI 
(CHŌKAN), Aug. 22, 1978, at 1. 
172
  Ōkurashō, Sarakin o Kyōroku ni Gyōsei Shidō—Nenritate Demo Hyōji, Kōrikisei to 2 Dan 
Kamae, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), Aug. 23, 1978, at 3. 
173
  Sarakin Kisei Hōan, Jiki Kokkai Seiritsu Hakare—Shushō Shiji, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Oct. 20, 1978, at 
1; Ōkurashō, Sarakin Kisei he Shusshi Hō Kaisei no Genan—Tōrokusei · 3 Nen Kōshin, NIKKEI (Chōkan), 
Dec. 12, 1978, at 3. 
174
  Id. 
175
  Seifu, Sarakin Kisei no Kashikingyou Kise Hōan no Kokkai Teishutsu Dannen, Giin Rippou Machi 
he, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Mar. 13, 1979, at 9. 
176
  Sarakin Kisei Hōan, Ōtsume de Nankō—Jiminan ni Yatō Ni no Ashi, Chōka Kinri no Atsukai ga 
Shōten ni, NIKKEI (Chōkan), May 10, 1979, at 3; Sarakin Kisei Hō, Yoyatō no Iken Chōsei Nakō—Gure-zo-
n ga Sōten, Saishū Ketsuron ha Raishu Ikōka, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, May 10, 1979, at 10. 
177
  Sarakin Kisei Hōan, Jimintō Tandoku Demo Kokkai Teishutsu he—Zaisei Bukai de Hōshin 
Katameru, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, May 17, 1979, at 10; Kashikingyō Kisei Hōan, Keizoku 
Shinsa ha Hisshi—Yoyatō ‘Gure-zo-n” de Tairitsu, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, June 11, 1979, at 9; 
Jimin, Sarakin Kisei Hōan Saiteishutsu o Kimeru, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Mar. 15, 1980, at 4; Kashikingyō 
Hōan no Kaitei Machikoshi he—Kinri Kisei Nuki no Hōan Shingi, Ōkura no ‘Matta” de Tekkai, NIHON 
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introduced and either defeated or withdrawn for further review.178  
Opposition parties also objected to LDP proposals that would reduce 
maximum interest rates to 54.75% rather than 36.5%.179  Small and medium 
lenders, then lending at 70% to 80%, opposed any reduction and “possessed 
vote getting power that the LDP could not ignore.”180   
The LDP then proposed to reduce interest rates over time, lowering 
the maximum interest rate to 40.0004% “at a future date” and keeping the 
“voluntary payment” provisions. 181  They admitted the law would overturn 
Supreme Court precedent but argued that it balanced the need for borrower 
protection with the need to improve an unstable business environment for 
lenders.182  Opposition parties and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
argued the proposal was a sop to industry, would increase problems, and turn 
the IRRA into a “shell.”183  After six years of debate, the LDP gathered 
enough support for the proposed regulatory structure to overcome opposition 
to the interest rate provisions.  The bill passed, as proposed, in 1983.184   
With this, the Diet revised the Investments, Deposits, and Interest 
Rates Act and enacted the third and final piece of legislation that regulates 
the consumer finance industry today, the Money Lending Industry 
Regulation Act.185  The Diet revised the former by amending Article 5 to 
reduce the interest-rate levels at which criminal penalties would attach “in 
instances where moneylending is conducted as a business.”186  The 
maximum interest rates would be reduced in stages, from 109.5% to 73% in 
                                                                                                                              
KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, Nov. 11, 1981, at 9; Bōri Sarakin Yurusanu, Kisei Hōan Konkokkai ni Teishutsu 
He Yoyatō Gōi—Jōgen Kinri Dankai Sage, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Mar. 20, 1982, at 7. 
178
  Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu Kankin, Akushitsugyōsha Haijo ni Kōka—“Kinri” no Kaizen Mada 
Mada, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 16, 1983, at 7. 
179
  Sarakin no “Tsuke” Itsumade—Kisei Hōan, Mata mo Ryūzan?, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 15, 1982, 
at 3. 
180
  Id. 
181
  “Myōyomi” no Kashikingyō Kiseihō—Jōgen Nenri 40.004%, Ōkura ha Seiritsu ni Muke-Maru, 
NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, May 11, 1982, at 12. 
182
  Id. (“This law is momentous as it seeks to overturn Supreme Court precedent setting out a right of 
demand return of interest.  It will improve the unstable business conditions facing lenders, and at the same 
time protect borrowers.  It must be passed this session of the Diet.”). 
183
  Nichibenren, Sarakin Kisei Hōan de Jimintō·Shakai ni Ikensho—Higaisha Fuyasu Osore, NIKKEI 
(Chōkan), July 23, 1982, at 3; Nichibenren nado, Sarakin Hōan Hihan, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 20, 1983, at 
31 (A law like this is likely to enlarge the usury pot (nabe), and is clearly tilted towards protecting the 
interests of industry.”). 
184
  Kashikingyō no Kisei nado ni Kansuru Hōritsu [The Money Lending Industry Regulation Act], 
Law No. 32 of 1983, available at  http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S58/S58HO032.html (last visited Jan. 15, 
2007) [hereinafter Money Lending Industry Regulation Act], translated in [STATUTE VOL.] DOING 
BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 152, pt. 7, app. 7C; Sarakin Kisei Hōan Sanin de Kaketsu, Shūin he, NIKKEI 
(Yūkan), Apr. 20, 1983, at 1. 
185
  Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184. 
186
  Id. art. 5, ¶ 2. 
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three years, to 54.75% in five years, and to 40.004% at an undetermined 
future date.187  Supplementary rules carved out exceptions for “daily 
installment lenders,” who “for the time being” could continue to lend at rates 
up to 109.5%.188  By this point the largest consumer finance companies were 
lending at rates below 50% and were largely unaffected.189 
These revisions were limited in comparison to the newly enacted 
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act.  The 1983 law imposed 
comprehensive regulation on the industry.190  Article 3 required money 
lenders operating in one jurisdiction to register with the governor’s office 
and those operating in multiple jurisdictions to register with the Ministry of 
Finance.191  Registration could be refused based on a finding of previous 
violations of the laws regulating the money lending industry.192  
Unregistered money lenders were prohibited from operating, and registered 
                                           
187
  Sarakin Kiseihō no Seiritsu, Akushitsugyōsha Tsuihō he, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 29, 1983, at 11; 
ONO, supra note 22, at 236. 
188
  Supplementary Rule Nos. 8-10 addressed “daily installment lenders” (nippu kashikingyōsha) 
lending to designated small-scale industries engaged in the production and sale of goods.  Repayment 
periods were required to be over 100 days in length, with the lender collecting in person at the debtor’s 
home or place of business.  The intent was to facilitate loans to small business by allowing payments from 
daily sales receipts, with the higher collection costs justifying the higher rates.  Lenders were required to 
make collection rounds on over 70% of the payment days in order to qualify for the higher interest rate.  
See ONO, supra note 22, at 238-40; Kinyūchō, Kashikingyōsha Kankei no Hōrei ni Tsuite, 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/chuui/hourei.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).  Lenders would advertise “one 
phone call/immediate lending” and “borrow ¥100,000 and pay only ¥1000 a day.” Hikake Kinyū, Jōken 
Kibishiku:  Saikōsai Handan Akushitsu Kōri Haijo ni Michibiku, ASASHI SHINBUN, Jan. 25, 2006, at 2.  
Supplementary Rule Nos. 14 & 15 provided additional exceptions for pawn brokers and “telephone 
subscription loans.”  NTT traditionally charged a substantial subscription fee for the installation of 
telephone service, and “telephone subscription loans” were secured by that subscription.  The principal 
amount of the loan could not exceed an amount specified by ordinance and tied to the cost of purchasing 
the subscription and installing the line.  See ONO, supra note 22, at 238-40. 
189
  Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu he—Akushitsugyōsha ha Eigyō Teishi, Sarakin Nabe Bōshi niha Genkai, 
NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 27, 1983, at 5. 
190
  Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu Kankin, Akushitsugyōsha Haijo ni Kōka—“Kinri” no Kaizen Mada 
Mada, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 16, 1983, at 7.  According to Article 1, “[t]he purpose of this Act is to 
establish a registration system for those engaged in the business of lending money, to set forth necessary 
restrictions on such businesses . . . and to protect interest of those in need of loans.” Money Lending 
Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 1.  
191
  Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 3.  Registration requires detailing: 
1) the trade name, designation, and address; 2) for legal entities, the names and addresses of officers; 3) for 
designated employees, the names and addresses of such employees; 4) for minors, the name and address of 
the legal representative; 5) the names and locations of the places of business or offices; 6) the types and 
methods of business; and 7) if other businesses are performed, the types of such businesses. Id.  Subsequent 
amendments added requirements for the listing of a designated principal at each office and contact 
information, including the office phone number, for any offices or places of business to be listed in 
advertisements or loans solicitations.  Id. art. 4.  The 2003 amendments required confirmation of the 
applicant’s identity, additional capital requirements and prohibitions on affiliation with organized crime.  
Kinyūchō, Kashikingyōsha Kankei no Hōrei ni Tsuite, http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/chuui/hourei.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2007).   
192
  Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 6, ¶ 5. 
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money lenders prohibited from operating at undisclosed places of 
business.193  Unregistered lenders were now subject to criminal penalties of 
up to three years imprisonment or a fine of up to ¥3 million.194   
The Money Lending Industry Regulation Act also required 
investigation of the borrower’s credit worthiness and prohibited loan 
contracts likely to exceed his or her ability to repay the loan, but assigned no 
penalty for violation.195  The Act prohibited collection practices that 
amounted to coercion (ihaku) or which “disturbed the peace of private life or 
work,”196 and for these violations imposed criminal penalities of up to six 
months imprisonment or a fine up to ¥1 million.197   
It also detailed new documentation requirements.  Lenders were 
required to disclose at their place of business information regarding interest 
rates, the method and period of payment, number of installments, and other 
information designated by ordinance.198  The Act required advertisements to 
include the interest rate and other information designated by ordinance, and 
also prohibited any representation considered false or misleading.199   
Pursuant to Article 17, lenders concluding a loan contract must 
“without delay” provide the borrower with written documentation clearly 
disclosing the terms of the loan contract.200   Pursuant to Article 18, when the 
borrower makes a payment, the lender “must promptly provide to the 
borrower receipt documents for each payment.” 201  The Act gave the Prime 
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  Id. art. 11, ¶¶ 1, 3. 
194
  Id. art. 47, ¶ 2. 
195
  Id. arts. 13, 36; Sarakin Kiseihō no Seiritsu, Akushitsugyousha Tsuihō he, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 
29, 1983, at 11.   
196
  Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 21.  Subsequent revisions gave 
specific examples including collection, absent justifiable reason, between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m., 
telephone or visits to the borrower’s place of work, and also prohibited the use of or sale of debt to 
members of organized crime.  See Kinyūchō, Kashikingyōsha Kankei no Hōrei ni Tsuite, 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/chuui/hourei.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
197
  Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 48. 
198
  Id. art. 14. 
199
  Id. arts. 15, 16. 
200
  Id. art. 17.  The loan contracts must include: 1) the tradename, designation, and address of the 
moneylender; 2) the date of execution of the contract; 3) the amount of the loan; 4) the interest rate on the 
loan; 5) the method of repayment; 6) the period for repayment and number of installments; 7) where there 
is a liquidated damages provision, the amount thereof; and 8) other items as designated by Ministry of 
Finance Ordinance.  Id. art. 17 ¶ 1, items 1-8. 
201
  Id. art. 18.  These receipt documents must contain: 1) the tradename, designation name, and 
address of the moneylender; 2) the date of execution of contract; 3) the amount of the loan; 4) the amount 
received and its apportionment to interest, principal or damages; 5) the date of receipt of payment; and 6) 
any other items designated by the Ministry of Finance.  Id. art. 18 ¶ 1, items 1-6.   Additional disclosures 
are required by ordinance including: 1) words indicating receipt of payment; 2) the moneylender’s 
registration number; 3) the borrower's name, commercial name, and registration number if any; 4) if a third 
party other than the borrower or guarantor made payment, that person's name, trade name, and/or 
registration number if any; and 5) the remaining amount of the loan after payment.  Enforcement 
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Minister and prefectural governors power to suspend a registered lender’s 
business for up to one year where the lender violates the disclosure and 
collection provisions and to cancel the lender’s registration where the 
circumstances are either particularly grave or a suspension order is 
violated.202  
At the same time, Article 43 rolled back the judicially developed 
norms of the 1960s.203  Prior to the 1983 legislation, approximately 30,000 
borrowers a year restructured or eliminated debt pursuant to the standards 
established by the Supreme Court.204  Article 43 now provided that where 
the borrower “voluntarily paid interest” in excess of the maximum interest 
rates and the borrower received the necessary documentation, that payment 
would be “deemed a valid payment of interest on the debt.”205  The 
articulated rationale was that moneylenders as registered entities were now 
subject to strict regulation, and Article 43 was intended to protect and 
encourage “good-faith lenders” by allowing them to charge higher interest 
rates.206  Proponents also argued that if debtors were able to demand a refund 
of excess interest rate payments, transactions would lose their certainty, and 
it would lead to an increase in black-market moneylending.207 
The provision was enormously unpopular within the scholarly 
community and the Japanese bar; they had opposed it from the start, without 
effect.208  In contrast, the judiciary opposed this change to great effect.  
There were no sweeping pronouncements, but there was a slow, incremental 
restriction of the Article’s application. 
Early on, lower courts held that Article 43 of the Money Lending 
Industry Regulation Act voids the intent of the IRRA and “is applicable only 
where the conditions imposed are strictly met.”209  Those conditions 
included the lender proving 1) it acted as a registered moneylender “engaged 
in the business”; 2) the borrower paid the money “voluntarily as interest”; 
and 3) the lender provided all of the proper documents.210 
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With regard to money paid “voluntarily as interest,” by 1985 summary 
courts were refusing to apply Article 43 where the lender failed to prove the 
borrower’s “expression of intent to designate the payment as an interest 
payment.”211  Courts apportioned the money paid by the debtor to the 
principal, damages, and interest within the caps.212  Later district courts held 
that “it is appropriate to require active intent” by the borrower to designate 
the payment voluntarily made as interest or damages in order to make an 
otherwise invalid debt valid.213 
The courts also focused on the documentation requirements.214  Where 
the lender failed to disclose all the items required in Article 17 when the loan 
was consummated, or where the documents contained mistakes or 
omissions, however slight, the courts refused to apply Article 43.  A 1988 
Kyoto court rejected an Article 43 claim by a lender charging interest rates 
of 73%.215  The court held that “all items” must be properly disclosed for 
Article 43 to apply and that did not happen where one loan contract 
disclosed the interest per day rather than per annum and a second failed to 
disclose the lender’s registration number.216  Other courts rejected 
application of Article 43 where the umbrella loan document miscalculated 
the minimum payment necessary to repay a ¥200,000 loan over a two-year 
time period.217  Other courts refused to apply Article 43 where the lender 
receipts incorrectly identified certain charges as “handling fees” instead of 
interest.218   
Lower courts applied the Article 18 documentation requirements with 
the same vigor.219  Article 18 requires that the lender provide the borrower 
with a receipt containing certain disclosures “promptly” on receipt of each 
payment.220  Paragraph 2 provides an exception: where payment is made by 
electronic transfer, the receipt is required “only upon request of the person 
making the payment.”221  The courts, however, routinely held that even with 
electronic payment and regardless of demand by the borrower, where the 
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lender did not promptly provide a receipt containing all of the required 
disclosures after each payment, they would not apply Article 43.222  Courts 
summarily rejected Article 43 claims where the lender did not offer proof 
they supplied the Article 18 documents.223  Courts demanded proof sua 
sponte when the borrower failed to appear in court.224  The courts found the 
Article 18 documentation requirements to be part of a process justifying the 
“voluntary payment” of an otherwise invalid debt.225   
The first appellate decision addressing Article 18 requirements 
rejected arguments that the borrower had contractually agreed to accept an 
electronic bank transfer receipt in lieu of the Article 18 receipts.226  
According to the Osaka High Court, it is only when the “lender strictly 
complies with the procedures” set out in Article 17 and Article 18 that they 
are entitled as a “special privilege” to charge otherwise invalid interest 
rates.227  “It is possible for the commercial lender, at the time of the loan, to 
use its superior position to force agreement to the substitution of simpler 
documentation.”228  To allow this would defeat the purpose of the statute:  to 
provide both evidence of payment in the event of a subsequent dispute and 
also “cause the borrower to clearly understand the costs associated with the 
debt and apportionment of the repayment.”229 
When Article 18 documents were provided, substantial compliance 
was not enough.  From “the standpoint of consumer protection,” all of the 
disclosures specified by law were required.230  Descriptions in the receipt of 
payments apportioned to “money advanced” were not specific enough.231  
Article 18 receipts omitting the lender’s address and registration number 
precluded Article 43 application.232 
                                           
222
  1152 HANREI JIHŌ 158, 159 (Kyoto Summary Ct., Aug. 8, 1984); 1187 HANREI JIHŌ 121, 123 
(Sasebo Summary Ct., July 23, 1985); 1318 HANREI JIHŌ 106, 109 (Kyoto D. Ct., Aug. 19, 1988); 705 
HANREI TAIMUZU 175, 176 (Osaka High Ct., Mar. 14, 1989). 
223
  1152 HANREI JIHŌ 158, 159 (Kyoto Summary Ct., Aug. 8, 1984). 
224
  1187 HANREI JIHŌ 121, 123 (Sasebo Summary Ct., July 23, 1985). 
225
  1318 HANREI JIHŌ 106 (Kyoto D. Ct., Aug. 19, 1988); 1152 HANREI JIHŌ 158 (Kyoto D. Ct., Aug. 
8, 1984); ONO, supra note 22, at 363. 
226
  705 HANREI TAIMUZU 175 (Osaka High Ct., Mar. 14, 1989). 
227
  Id. at 176. 
228
  Id. 
229
  Id.  Absent demand, failure to provide Article 18 documentation would not result in criminal 
penalty, but it would preclude a creditor from making claim for gray zone interest charges pursuant to 
Article 43.  See 652 HANREI TAIMZU 246, 249-50 (Osaka D. Ct., Sept. 26, 1986). 
230
  705 HANREI TAIMZU 175 (Osaka High Ct., Mar. 14, 1989). 
231
  1250 HANREI JIHŌ 70 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 3, 1986).   
232
  168 MINSAI SHIRYŌ 58 (Sapporo Summary Ct., Nov. 29, 1985). 
JUNE 2008 JAPAN AND THE MONEYLENDERS 557 
  
The courts also focused on the “voluntariness” of the payments.  
When a loan contract required discounted interest payments, a Tokyo 
District Court found: 
[U]nder circumstances where absent prepayment of interest 
financing will not be received, payment by the debtor cannot be 
said to be voluntary. . . . As a result, even if prepayment of 
interest is done by agreement, it is appropriate to find that it is 
not subject to application of Article 43.233 
The court ignored the parties’ agreement, found the prepayment terms 
imposed, and found no “voluntary” repayment as a result. 
An Osaka District Court examined the Article 43 requirements and 
found all the requirements met, save one.234  The court refused to apply 
Article 43 holding: 
In order for the condition of voluntariness to be met, it is 
reasonable to interpret that the borrower must be aware that the 
interest and penalty payments they are making exceeded the 
restrictions set out in the [IRRA], and while aware of that 
voluntarily make payment. 235 
The court required proof of the borrower’s subjective knowledge of the 
IRRA restrictions and, absent that, found no “voluntary” payment. 236 
The Osaka High Court pulled back from these aggressive attempts to 
protect borrowers and reversed.237  In 1990, the Supreme Court affirmed its 
decision.238  The Supreme Court found the purpose of the moneylending 
industry law was to secure the appropriate functioning of the industry, and to 
“protect the interests of the suppliers of capital.”239  Where the contract 
documentation and receipt documentation complied with the intent of the 
law, that was sufficient: “[I]t is not required that the borrower understand 
that the amount paid exceeded the interest or anticipatory damages 
limitations set out in [the IRRA] or that the contract, as to the portion in 
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excess, was void.”240  The Court found that if the plaintiff made the payment 
with the understanding it would be applied to interest and penalties, this 
payment was made “of their own free will,” and this was sufficient to apply 
Article 43 to validate gray zone lending.241   
The Supreme Court endorsed a flexible interpretation of the Article 43 
requirements, and was roundly criticized by the bar and by legal scholars.242  
It was the Court’s last such decision.  Shortly thereafter, in 1991, Japan’s 
economic bubble collapsed.  The stock and real estate markets collapsed, 
and, while that proved a disaster for the banks, it was a “boon for consumer 
finance.”243  Those who could no longer obtain bank loans after the value of 
their landholdings and other collateral fell turned to the finance companies 
and, thereafter, the courts.244 
Despite the 1990 Supreme Court decision, the lower courts continued 
to restrictively interpret the lending laws.245  A Tokyo District Court again 
found that regardless of agreement by the parties, where it was plain that 
absent prepayment of interest refinancing would not occur, “it cannot be said 
that payment was voluntary.”246  Later high courts agreed.247   Other courts 
examining discounted interest found that the law contemplated “the actual 
payment of cash,” and where “the defendant did not receive tender of cash 
payment for interest, they would not receive application of Article 43.”248  
The courts continued to focus on documentation.  A Nagoya District 
Court found that, despite mistakes, the documents “if read carefully were 
sufficient for the average person to understand the terms of the contract” and 
sufficient to apply Article 43.249  The Nagoya Appellate Court disagreed, 
finding that “the contract documents must be sufficiently comprehensive, 
clear and concrete to allow the borrower to correctly understand the nature 
of the debt and be able to reference the documentation in formulating a 
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repayment plan.”250  In that case, the document was difficult to understand, 
and the defendant was “a large-scale money lender with a nationwide 
business operation, and the development of documents setting forth the 
disclosure contents outlined above . . . cannot be thought of as overly 
difficult.”251 
The lower courts after the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision adopted “a 
strict posture” holding that the items enumerated in Article 17 must be 
included in toto for Article 43 to apply.252  Some held that the disclosures 
must be contained on one sheet of paper, and where they were not, refused to 
apply Article 43.253  An appellate court held that “where it is made clear” 
that the Article 17 disclosures are supplemented in a separate document, “as 
an exception,” that will satisfy Article 17.254  However, the court still refused 
to apply Article 43 because, in that case, it was not made clear enough.255  
Where a lender offered revolving credit, both the umbrella contract and 
subsequent loan documents taken together must satisfy all the requirements 
of Article 17.256  According to some courts, the statutorily required 
disclosure of “the amount of the loan” required a detailed accounting of the 
principal, interest and damages from any outstanding loans.257 
Some courts found that, regardless of documentation, repayment made 
by the borrower via ATM or electronic bank transfer could not be 
“voluntary.”258  While the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary for 
the borrower to understand that they were paying excess interest charges, 
lower courts could still hold that a borrower must be able to understand what 
portion of the payment would be applied to interest and penalties.259  Courts 
held payments made in person would allow the borrower, if dissatisfied with 
the apportionment of the payment to interest and penalties, to promptly 
complain and refuse or withdraw payment.  “In contrast, payment when 
made by standard methods using an ATM, does not allow the user to know 
beforehand the amount of money that will be allotted to interest and 
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damages pursuant to the contract.”260  As a result “it cannot be recognized as 
voluntary payment of interest.”261   
In 1999, the Supreme Court examined Article 18.262  It acknowledged 
that when a borrower voluntarily pays interest in excess of the statutory 
caps, that excess may be deemed repayment of valid interest-rate charges 
pursuant to Article 43: 
However, even when this payment is [electronically deposited] 
to a lender’s account or savings account, absent special 
circumstances, it is reasonable to find that the lender on 
confirmation of receipt of this payment must immediately 
provide to the borrower, each time, a document as prescribed in 
Article 18 paragraph 1.263   
In other words, the Supreme Court required lenders provide detailed receipts 
for each payment made by ATM or it would not recognize gray zone interest 
rates.  Commentators argued that with this decision the Supreme Court 
affirmed the strict interpretation seen in the lower courts.264   
This decision came as finance companies again assumed the spotlight.  
As banks stopped lending to businesses in the early 1990s, the finance 
companies continued, with some specializing in business or shōkō loans.  
Ninety-nine out of 100 companies in Japan are small or medium sized 
businesses,265 and by 1999 they were collectively borrowing ¥14 trillion 
from non-bank sources.266  Of that, ¥8 trillion came from finance companies, 
including the two largest business loan companies, Nichiei Co. and Shōkoh 
Fund.267  Both loan companies were favorites of foreign investors.  Japan 
funds had begun targeting Shōkoh Fund with its average growth rate of 39% 
per year.268  Nichiei Co. was 30% owned by foreign investors and had listed 
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.269    
Nichiei Co. had also engaged in unsavory collection tactics.  Business 
loans were offered without collateral for amounts up to ¥10 million, but they 
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required a guarantor.270  In October 1999, one such guarantor filed suit 
against Nichiei Co. alleging, inter alia, that its loan collectors had demanded 
the guarantor sell an eyeball or kidney to raise money to repay the loan.271  A 
few weeks later, the Metropolitan Police Department arrested the former 
employee,272 and the Financial Services Agency (“FSA”) started an 
investigation into shōkō lending practices.273   
There was little tolerance for such tactics.  While Nichiei Co. and 
Shōkoh Fund were growing by leaps and bounds in the late 1990s, the rest of 
the economy was undergoing “shock therapy” with record bankruptcies, 
record unemployment, and continuous restructuring announcements. 274  The 
FSA sanctioned Nichiei Co.,275 and the Diet enacted new legislation.276 
The drafters acknowledged the December 1999 legislation was 
rushed, left issues unresolved, and they provided for re-evaluation of the 
legislation three years hence.277  In the interim, the LDP and its coalition 
partners enacted mandatory disclosure requirements for loan guarantors and 
mandatory notices to guarantors when providing additional financing.278  
They added new regulations regarding collection practices vis-à-vis loan 
guarantors and increased the penalty provisions.279  Revisions to the 
Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act reduced the interest rates at 
which criminal penalties would attach from 40.004% to the current 29.2%, 
and the IRRA was revised to lower the limits on liquidated damages to 1.46 
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times the maximum IRRA rates.280  The new legislation reduced the gap and 
gray zone lending but did not eliminate it. 
In 2003, just as the 
lending laws were to be re-
evaluated, consumer finance 
again found its way into the 
limelight.  On June 14, 2003, 
a sixty-one year old cleaning 
company worker, his wife, 
and her eighty-one year old 
brother jumped in front of a 
Japan Railways train.281  Their 
suicide note detailed their 
debts and described how debt 
collectors had called the house 
every night and threatened to 
“get it from their 
neighbors.”282  They had decided to “apologize with [their] lives.”283 
The suicide note again focused media attention on the finance 
companies, particularly the black market lenders.  While most “legal” 
money lenders are registered, comply to a lesser or greater degree with the 
regulations and lend in the gray zone, black-market money lenders either 
operate without registration or register and operate outside the established 
regulatory framework.284  Commentators estimated the victims of black-
market or illegal lending practices numbered anywhere from 120,000 to over 
1 million people.285  Statistics maintained by the National Police Agency, 
showed that organized crime was heavily involved in black-market 
lending.286 
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Arrests of Organized Crime Members Violating Public Lending Laws287 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Arrests for violation 





46/23 56/33 56/38 41/22 64/20 52/23 130/63 
Arrests for violation 
of the Investment, 
Deposit and Interest 
Rate Restriction Act/ 
Organized crime 
members arrested 
57/19 60/25 80/17 57/26 76/31 68/25 258/77 
 
In 2003, the police arrested Susumu Kajiyama, the “king of the black-
market lenders” and a couple of his twenty-one “presidents.”288  Together, 
they oversaw a black-market lending operation run by the Yamaguchi crime 
family that included approximately 1000 offices and brought in profits of 
¥10 billion annually.289  The investigation showed that consumer finance had 
become a principle source of funding for organized crime in Japan.290  It also 
showed that Kajiyama had organized black-market lending operations as 
part of an intentional strategy during the economic stagnation of the 1990s to 
move from traditional sources of funds to income sources that targeted the 
general public.291  During this time, black-market lenders began direct-mail 
advertising to large numbers of distressed borrowers and those that had filed 
for bankruptcy.292  Police investigations showed employees soliciting loans 
with interest rates over a thousand times the legal rate and working in offices 
constructed from karaoke boxes in order to muffle the sounds of their 
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collection calls.293  Lenders would go to the debtors’ homes, threaten to 
reveal their debts to their neighbors, and, absent payment, drive around the 
debtor’s house broadcasting the debt over a megaphone. 294 
A little over a month following the Osaka suicides the Diet revised the 
consumer lending laws.295  In July 2003, the Diet passed the Black Market 
Finance Countermeasures Act296 to address the problems associated with 
unregistered money lenders and illegal collection practices.297  The Act 
raised the criminal penalties for unregistered lenders to a maximum of five 
years imprisonment and ¥10 million in fines.298  Japanese courts suspend 
most sentences under three years, so this meant that actual time would now 
be served.299   
The Act increased the registration requirements and precluded 
registration by those associated with organized crime.300  It increased basic 
capital requirements for registration to ¥30 million for individuals.301  It 
prohibited advertising or loan solicitation by unregistered lenders, applied 
the collection provisions to unregistered lenders, and raised the fines 
associated with unregistered lending and illegal collection practices.302  The 
Act also banned advertisements listing only cell phone numbers, misleading 
advertisements, and solicitions aimed at borrowers without an ability to 
repay.303   
The new law set out examples of prohibited collection practices 
designed to coerce or oppress the borrower including collection during the 
hours from 9 p.m. to 8 a.m. “without a justifiable reason,” and telephone 
calls or visits to the borrower’s work place or other places apart from the 
home.  The legislation prohibited demands for repayment from third parties 
other than a guarantor without express permission from the borrower. 304  It 
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prohibited demands for pension documents and other “inappropriate means” 
of loan maintenance and collection.305  The legislation prohibited the 
employment or assistance of any person associated with organized crime or 
assignment of debt to the same, and it required for the first time the 
placement of a trained compliance officer at each place of business. 306   
The law provided that where a lender “engaged in the business of 
lending” loaned money at an interest rate in excess of 109.5%, that loan 
contract was invalid, in toto, and the borrower need not pay any interest 
whatsoever.307  Criminal penalties for loans made in excess of the designated 
interest rates were raised to a maximum of five years imprisonment and ¥10 
million in fines.308 
The Supreme Court followed in 2003 with a trilogy of decisions that 
reduced the fees that finance companies could charge.  Each decision found 
that loan guarantee fees paid by the borrower to a loan guaranty company 
wholly-owned by the lender would be construed as interest received by the 
lender, and subject to the rate restrictions in the IRRA.309  Each decision 
found that where a borrower voluntarily pays interest on one loan in excess 
of the IRRA caps, that excess, after paying off the principal of the loan, will 
be applied as payment on other outstanding loans, and the lender “cannot 
obtain interest during the contractually designated period on this 
principal.”310 
The Supreme Court handed down three decisions in 2004 involving 
financing companies’ small business or shōkō loans.  In each case, the 
Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions finding for the lender.  In a 
February 2004 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with those lower courts 
that had found that Article 43 had no application where the interest payments 
had been discounted by the lender.311  The court also found the requirements 
of Article 43 “should be strictly interpreted” and that “all of the items” 
designated in Article 17 must be included in the loan documents.  Where any 
item was missing, including in this case a description of the collateral, 
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Article 43 would not apply.  Article 18 receipt documents must be provided 
“immediately after payment,” and, in this case, where the receipts were sent 
twenty days after payment, Article 43 would not apply.312  A second decision 
in February 2004 found that the lenders sending Article 18 receipt 
documents and the bank’s electronic payment forms prior to the payment 
date would not satisfy Article 43.313  In July 2004, the Supreme Court ruled 
that mailing the Article 18 documents within seven to ten days was 
insufficient.314 
In 2005, the Supreme Court resolved a split among the lower courts 
finding that while there was no statutory requirement for a lender to disclose 
a borrower’s transaction history, the borrower had a right to demand the 
same.315  The court imposed on the lender a “good faith duty” to disclose the 
borrower’s transaction history and found where they violated that duty such 
action constituted tortious conduct.316  In 2005, the Supreme Court again 
found that the requirements of Article 17 “must be interpreted strictly” and 
where a “revolving credit” contract precluded disclosure of each item 
required by Article 17, the lender was not absolved from its duty to disclose 
but required to “disclose information corresponding to those items.”317   
Finally, in the first three months of 2006, the Supreme Court handed 
down a series of decisions that effectively ended gray zone lending.  In a 
January 13, 2006 decision, the Court examined the acceleration and penalty 
provisions found in most loan contracts.318  The provisions were standard:  
in the event of default, payment of the remaining principal and interest were 
due immediately, with penalties, and with interest on this sum payable at 
29.2%.319  The Supreme Court overturned a lower court decision in favor of 
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the lender declaring that the acceleration clause made the payment of the 
gray zone interest coerced rather than voluntary.320   
Article 43 was “an exception” that in light of the intent of the statute 
to “protect the interests of the borrower” should “be strictly construed.”321  
In determining whether “interest was voluntarily paid,” the Court would 
look at whether there was “coercion in fact.”322  The Court found that where 
there was a liquidated damages and acceleration clause borrowers would pay 
the excess interest to avoid the penalties; as a result, absent special 
circumstances, “it cannot be said that the borrower paid the portion of 
interest in excess of the rate restrictions of their own free will.”323 
A January 19 decision quickly followed affirming this holding and 
addressing collection practices.324  The Court would require clear evidence 
that the excess interest was paid voluntarily, and, with regard to collection 
practices, that meant more than proof the lender did not violate laws that 
could result in administrative or criminal penalties.325  The courts would 
look at the “totality of the circumstances” and whether the borrower paid the 
excess interest rate charges “of their own free will.”326 
 On January 24, 2006, the Court handed down two additional 
decisions, both reversing lower courts finding for the lender.327  Both 
targeted “daily installment lenders.”328  The Court found in the first January 
24 decision that the Article 17 documentation requirements were not met.329  
According to the Court, all designated items must be disclosed, and “when 
they are not disclosed in a manner that is accurate and clear, the conditions 
for applying Article 43 paragraph 1 are not met.”330  The Court found the 
language in the contract inaccurate when “moneys received” by the 
borrower was not in fact the money tendered by the lender but included a 
balance from previous loans.331  The Court found the contract language was 
unclear where it described days when the lender would not make collection 
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calls as “customary holidays when transactions are not done.”332  Daily 
installment lenders “must meet in fact” all of the conditions imposed by 
statute in order to charge the higher interest rates.333  The Court's second 
January 24 decision reiterated that where there was the threat of liquidated 
damages and acceleration, payment in excess of the IRRA caps was not 
voluntary, and so long as the borrower paid the interest and principal 
recognized by law there was no default. 334  With these decisions, Japanese 
scholars talked of a “substantive change in the jurisprudence” of the 
Court.335 
Finally, in Febuary and March 2006, the Supreme Court again 
reversed lower courts finding for the lender.  In a February decision, the 
borrower had borrowed money pledging property as collateral, defaulted, 
and entered into a sales agreement with a buy-back option for the same 
parcel.  The option expired, the lender sought to evict, and the Supreme 
Court found the contract “was not a true sales contract with a buy-back 
option.” 336  The Court found there was no evidence of intent to transfer and 
construed the contract, in substance, as a loan contract subject to the legal 
prescriptions on foreclosure.337  In a March decision, the Supreme Court 
again strictly interpreted the requirements of Article 18 and struck down a 
Cabinet Order.338  While the statute permitted the Cabinet to order 
disclosures in addition to those enumerated in the statute, the Cabinet Order 
had permitted the substitution of “the contract number” for “the date of 
contract” in the lender’s receipt documents.  This “exceeded the bounds of 
discretion provided in the law and as such is an illegal regulation.”  The 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, found the Article 18 documentation 
requirements not met, and found Article 43 inapplicable.339   
In the first three months of 2006, the Supreme Court handed down six 
decisions involving finance companies.  Each reversed a lower court finding 
for the lender.  Each strictly construed the documentation requirements and 
narrowly construed the provisions in Article 43 permitting lending at gray 
zone interest rates.  Taken together, they eliminated gray zone lending.   
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III. THE 2006 LEGISLATION  
A. The Legislative Process  
After the Supreme Court’s January decisions, claims for the refund of 
interest charges spiked.340  First hundreds, then thousands of people filed 
suit.341  The industry had already begun to lose in the lower courts and 
lobbying to raise or abolish interest rates caps.342  The Supreme Court 
decisions sealed their fate in the courts and made it difficult for the Diet to 
raise interest rates.343  The consumer finance companies began mediating 
cases instead of trying them, and by February 2006, estimates for fiscal year 
2005 payments exceeded ¥500 billion.344  The Japanese Association of 
Certified Public Accountants called for the industry to book a one time 
charge for all associated losses.345  The share prices of the four main 
consumer finance companies plunged.346  The consumer finance companies’ 
“honeymoon relationship” with the banking industry was over.347 
The lending laws regulating the consumer finance industry had long 
been seen as “Diet legislation.” 348  The result, according to one FSA official, 
was that the administrative agencies were not proactive, “though they shared 
a bed, they had different dreams (dōshō imu).”349  That changed after the 
2006 Supreme Court decisions.  The FSA followed the January decisions 
announcing in February its plan to eliminate gray zone lending “in response 
to the current trend established by the Supreme Court in its de facto rejection 
of gray zone interest rates.” 350  The FSA also announced plans to establish a 
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new comprehensive Consumer Credit Law, and, as a temporary measure, to 
revise its rules to prohibit the use of acceleration clauses incorporating 
interest penalties at gray zone rates and to introduce regulations to reduce 
excessive lending.351  The latter included investigation and documentation 
requirements of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan without jeopardizing 
their ability to live or requiring a pledge of their home as collateral.352   
The FSA also stepped up enforcement.  In April 2006, the FSA shut 
down Aiful Corporation as a sanction for systemic loan collection abuses, all 
1,700 branches for three days and five branches for twenty to twenty-five 
days.353  Aiful had been found attempting to collect on a loan completed with 
a borrower diagnosed with dementia, harassing borrowers demanding 
repayment, and demanding that borrowers obtain money from third parties 
to repay loans.354  In one instance, an Aiful employee dragged a borrower 
out of his apartment and forced him to borrow money from a nearby liquor 
store to make a loan payment.355  Reports of consumer finance company 
employees telling borrowers to kill themselves so the company could collect 
the life insurance also surfaced.356  In short order, eighty-one banks 
announced they were reconsidering their capital and working relationship 
with Aiful.357 
Reports of overwhelming numbers of Japanese indebted to consumer 
finance companies increased pressure for reform.358  The FSA released 
documents showing one in every seven Japanese adults indebted to a lender 
reporting to the Federation of Credit Bureaus.359  Reports showed disturbing 
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trends in filings for bankruptcy and in the numbers of financially related 
suicides.360 
 
Bankruptcy in Japan: 
Individual Filings361 
Suicide in Japan:  Financially 
Related Suicides & Composite 
Numbers362 
1990 11,273 1990 1,272 21,346 
1991 23,288 1991 1,660 21,084 
1992 43,144 1992 2,062 22,104 
1993 43,545 1993 2,484 21,851 
1994 40,385 1994 2,418 21,670 
1995 43,414 1995 2,793 22,445 
1996 56,494 1996 3,025 23,104 
1997 71,299 1997 3,556 24,391 
1998 103,803 1998 6,058 32,863 
1999 122,741 1999 6,758 33,048 
2000 139,280 2000 6,838 31,957 
2001 160,457 2001 6,845 31,042 
2002 214,638 2002 7,940 32,143 
2003 242,357 2003 8,897 34,427 
2004 211,402 2004 7,947 32,325 
2005 184,422 
 
2005 7,956 32,552 
 
Those numbers told only part of the story.  While there is a stigma 
associated with bankruptcy in Japan, suicide has been described by some as 
“honorable.”363  FSA documents showed that the consumer finance 
companies took advantage of this:  for fiscal year 2005, seventeen consumer 
finance companies received a combined ¥4.3 billion in suicide policy 
payouts on approximately 4,908 borrowers.364 
A deliberative council (shingikai) established by the FSA pursuant to 
the 2003 revisions had been meeting for a year and on April 21, 2006 
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published its midterm report.365  They recommended eliminating gray zone 
lending by lowering interest rates, adding administrative penalties for 
excessive lending, requiring lender participation in credit reporting agencies, 
and establishing a counseling system for distressed borrowers.366   
The LDP quickly followed suit with their own recommendations.  In 
July 2006, the finance committees for the LDP and Kōmeitō jointly 
announced their “Basic Framework Regarding Revision of the 
Moneylending Industry.” 367  The LDP committee acknowledged a split 
among its members but concluded that new legislation should abolish gray 
zone lending and reduce the 29.2% public law caps imposing criminal 
penalties to the civil law maximum of 20% found in the IRRA.368 
This time the consumer finance industry protested loudly.369  Industry 
advocates argued that “many borrowers would be shunted out of the legal 
markets, and, as a result, not only will many borrowers be forced into 
economic ruin, but they will be susceptible to the coercive measures of the 
black market lenders.”370  They argued that reductions in the interest rate 
caps would both increase black market lending371 and adversely affect the 
entire economy.372  With the proposed interest rate reductions coming on top 
of the Bank of Japan’s move from a zero interest rate policy, as many as 
4400 small and medium sized lenders would go bankrupt.373  For the large 
consumer finance companies, a 5% reduction in interest rates would result in 
a loss of ¥500 million in revenue for each.374  Industry representatives 
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predicted restructuring of close to 30,000 employees.375  Researchers 
predicted a reduction in Japan’s gross domestic product of over ¥2 trillion.376 
The LDP then proposed lowering the caps from 29.2% to 20% three 
years after the law went into effect and adding a special ordinance 
permitting interest rate charges up to 28% for five years.  In effect, the LDP 
proposed a delay of nine years before any real reduction.  The LDP also 
proposed limiting loans to new borrowers to ¥500,000 per year or ¥300,000 
per six months, requiring investigation of the borrower’s ability to repay 
loans over ¥1 million, and increasing criminal penalties.377  At the same 
time, however, they sought increases in the IRRA caps so that interest rates 
of up to 20% could be charged on loans up to ¥500,000, 18% charged on 
loans up to ¥5 million, and 15% on loans in excess of ¥5 million.378  In other 
words, the LDP proposed a 2% increase in the caps applicable to most 
consumer loans and a 3% increase on larger loans up to ¥5 million. 
There was a backlash from the opposition parties, as expected.379  The 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations and consumer interest groups also 
protested.380  The Bar argued that the spike in lending by organized crime 
that led to the 2003 legislation was the result of a conscious strategy 
implemented in the mid-1990s and not the result of the previous reductions 
in the interest rate caps.381  They pointed to interest rates cuts from 54.75% 
to 29.2% during the fifteen years from 1991-2006 and, at the same time, the 
number of borrowers doubling.382  They argued that the LDP proposal was 
unmitigated “industry protection.”383 
Outside the LDP, sympathy for the consumer finance industry was 
limited.  Financial numbers for Takefuji, Acom, Promise and Aiful stood in 
stark contrast to the statistics released for personal bankruptcies and 
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Jimin Gōdō Kaigi de Kecchaku, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.business-i.jp/news/sou-page/news/200609160028aq.nwc; Kashikingyō Kisei, Jimin ga 
Kecchaku Yotōnaini Ondosa Hōan Seiritsu nao Hai-Iro, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006.   
380
  Risoku Seigenhō “Riage” ni Hanpatsu Kashikingyō seido no Minaoshi “Jimintōan ha Gyōsha 
Hogo”, TOKYO SHINBUN, Oct. 5, 2006, at 10.   
381
  Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 18-19. 
382
  Id. at 19. 
383
  Id. 
574 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 3 
 
 
suicides.384  The 2004 numbers disseminated by the FSA showed the four 
main consumer finance companies borrowing from the banks at less than 2% 
and lending at 27% to 29%.385  Each had over ¥1 billion in outstanding loans 
and over two million outstanding loan accounts.386  Each had before tax 
operating profits of approximately ¥1 billion.387  The top four consumer 
finance companies all ranked in the top forty companies in Japan in terms of 
declared taxable income, with Acom just below Sharp Corp. and Takefuji 
just above Japan Tobacco.388  
For the first time, there was also a backlash within the LDP.389  Older 
LDP members argued the proposal would “deal a mortal blow” to the 
consumer finance industry and decrease the credit available to consumers.390  
Younger LDP members argued in response that only the elimination of gray 
zone lending would address the growing problems of a class of borrowers 
that has arisen not as a result of profligate spending but a result of the 
unemployment and bankruptcies that occurred throughout the 1990s.391 
Less than two weeks after its initial proposal, the FSA submitted a 
new proposal to the LDP.  The new proposal maintained the increases in the 
IRRA caps, but scaled back the special ordinance provisions from five years 
to two and reduced the special rate from 28% to 25.5%.392  Masusumi 
Gōtōda, a young LDP member appointed by the Prime Minister to the 
Cabinet as a Director of Financial and Economic Policy, resigned his 
position in protest calling this compromise proposal “the worst possible 
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  Kashikingyō Kisei de Minaoshi Tokurei 2nen, 25.5% de Kecchaku Jimin Gōdō Kaigi de 
Kecchaku, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006; Keizai Juku—Dai 24 Kai—Tajū Saimusha Mondai 
niha Kinri Seigen Igai de Kaiketsu Subeki Da, SHŪKAN TŌYŌ KEIZAI, Oct. 14, 2006, at 13. 
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outcome.” 393  In media interviews, he blasted the LDP for twenty years of 
indifference and strong ties to the consumer finance industry.  He disclosed 
that the first proposals for reform were from industry factions within the 
LDP and were intended to eliminate the caps.394  He argued the LDP 
proposals flew in the face of the council report and vowed to continue to 
protest “as a single party member.” 395 
Industry had not requested the special ordinance.396  Worried about the 
combined hit from lawsuit related losses and reduced revenue from the 
proposed interest rate reductions, they opposed the elimination of the gray 
zone lending.397  They were not alone.  The U.S. Department of Treasury and 
U.S. financial companies strongly criticized the proposed reforms.398 
Citigroup and General Electric Co. were active operators in Japan’s 
¥20 trillion consumer finance industry.399  The finance division of General 
Electric had purchased Honobono Reiku, the sixth largest lender in the 
consumer finance industry, in 1998.400  The Citigroup subsidiary CFJ 
purchased Deikku Aiku in 2003, then the fifth largest lender in the 
industry.401  Foreign investors owned 20% to 34% of the stock of Aiful, 
Promise, and Acom.402  Takefuji, the largest finance company, had listed on 
the London Stock Exchange in 2000, and, by 2006, foreign investors owned 
56% of its voting stock.403  Takefuji sought to reassure investors with full-
page advertisments in the Wall Street Journal promoting its “voluntary 
efforts towards a sound consumer finance market.” 404  It also announced an 
increase in its annual dividend to over 5%.405  The foreign lobby argued 
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legislation should strengthen the regulation of illegal practices and the black-
market moneylenders, but interest rates should be left to the markets.406   
By the end of October, the debate was over, and the special ordinance 
calling for a ceiling of 25.5% on small short-term loans was withdrawn.407  
The Cabinet formalized a bill on October 31, 2006 for submission to a 
special session of the Diet.408  It would lower interest rates ceilings within 
three years, limit loans to borrowers, as well as implement stricter 
procedural requirements including a ban on lenders taking out life insurance 
policies on borrowers that covered suicide.409 
B. An Outline of the 2006 Legislation  
Announcements by both Takefuji and Aiful in November of their first 
ever net loss were followed by Acom and Promise posting losses as a result 
of the set-asides to pay claims, but that made no difference.410  On December 
20, 2006, the Diet passed Law No. 115 of 2006.411 
The legislation is to be implemented in four stages.412  The first stage 
took effect January 2007 and, pursuant to Article 1, immediately raised the 
criminal penalties in the Money Lending Industry Regulation Act for 
unregistered moneylenders to a maximum of ten years imprisonment and/or 
a fine of ¥30 million.413  At the same time, the Investments, Deposits, and 
Interest Rates Act was revised to establish the same penalties for receipt of 
or demand for payment of interest in excess of 109.5% per annum.414 
Article 2 sets out changes to take place within a year of 
promulgation.415  It expands the conditions under which the FSA can refuse 
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to accept the registration of a lender to include those circumstances where 
the applicant has not developed the necessary business structure to 
appropriately engage in the moneylending industry and where the applicant 
is recognized to have engaged in other businesses contrary to the public 
interest.416  The Article requires that the moneylender or its agent establish 
systems to appropriately handle information relating to prospective 
borrowers, and it prohibits the use of false or misleading information or the 
omission of material information regarding the contract.417 
Article 2 prohibits lenders from taking out life insurance policies on 
borrowers that payoff in the event of suicide, and requires the borrower’s 
consent to otherwise conclude life insurance contracts that name the lender 
as a beneficiary.418  It requires the lender “to make efforts” to introduce 
prospective borrowers who are found in need of assistance to credit 
counseling services.419  It adds a suitability provision, requiring lenders to 
conduct their business in a manner that does not lead to “unsuitable 
solicitation” that disadvantages prospective borrowers in light of the 
borrower’s knowledge, experience, finances, and purpose for entering into 
the loan contract.420 
Article 2 imposes a duty on the lender to provide additional written 
disclosures to joint guarantors and in contracts establishing a line of 
credit.421  It states that a lender may not refuse a borrower’s request to 
examine transaction records absent clear evidence the request is made for 
improper purposes.422  It requires disclosures to the borrower explaining the 
compulsory foreclosure provisions that arise with the completion of a 
notarized contract.423  The Article requires advance disclosure of the total 
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amount of principal and interest necessary to repay the loan.424  It also now 
restricts collection calls and home visits during the day, absent a justifiable 
reason, where the borrower has made a request regarding the time for 
repayment.  It prohibits the lender from remaining at the borrower’s home or 
place of business after the borrower has requested that the lender leave the 
premises.425 
Article 2 of the 2006 legislation also strengthens administrative 
oversight providing for administrative orders when deemed necessary to 
protect the interest of the borrower, or to change or reform designated 
business practices.426  Where lending practices violate the law or 
administrative dispositions, the lender’s registration may be canceled or an 
order issued suspending all or a portion of the lender’s business or removing 
its directors.427  All moneylenders must now provide regular business 
reports, and either belong to a self regulatory industry association licensed 
by the Prime Minister’s Office, or submit to “appropriate supervision” by the 
government based on the business practice guidelines established by the 
association.428 
Within one and one-half years of enforcement of the Article 2 
requirements, Article 3 increases the basic capital requirements for the 
moneylending industry to an amount established by cabinet order not below 
¥20 million and begins an examination system for the compliance officers 
within the finance companies.429  During this stage, a system of designated 
credit reporting agencies, licensed by the Prime Minister’s Office, is to be 
established,430 replacing the current hodge-podge of organizations with 
voluntary membership and limited information sharing.431  Regulations are 
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to be promulgated regarding the sharing of information among the credit 
reporting agencies, mandatory membership by lenders, and licensing and 
approval of the agencies.432 
Finally, within two and one-half years of enforcement of the Article 2 
provisions, Article 4 provides that lenders are required to have at each place 
of business a registered compliance officer who has passed the examination 
administered by the Prime Minister’s Office, and the cabinet order is to be 
revised to require basic operating capital in excess of ¥50 million.433  The 
conclusion of contracts along with the receipt or demand for payment of 
interest charges in excess of the IRRA caps will be prohibited.  Prior to 
completing the contract, the lender will be required to investigate the 
customer’s ability to repay the loan, and, if the prospective borrower is an 
individual, obtain a credit history from a designated credit information 
agency.  The lender is then prohibited from completing loan contracts for 
amounts that exceed the borrower’s ability to repay.434  Where the lender 
offers a loan in excess of ¥500,000 or a loan that results in debt loads in 
excess of ¥1 million, the lender must also obtain proof of annual income.435  
Absent other designated liquid assets, the lender is then prohibited from 
lending an amount either individually or in conjunction with other lenders 
that exceeds one-third of the customer’s annual income.436  Where a contract 
establishes a line of credit, the lender will be required to establish 
monitoring systems to regularly obtain credit information from a designated 
credit information agency regarding repayment ability.  The lender must then 
limit additional financing so that the total outstanding loans held by the 
borrower does not exceed one-third of their annual income.437 
At this point, Article 43, which provides for “voluntary payment” of 
interest charges in excess of the statutory maximums, will be abolished and 
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along with it “gray zone lending.”438  In conjunction with this, Article 5 
provides for the IRRA’s revision to include special rules regulating the 
apportionment of payment where the borrower and lender have entered into 
multiple lending contracts, and anticipatory damages on default are to be 
limited to 20%.439  Special rules will also incorporate any guarantee fees 
paid with the interest rate charged, subjecting both to the maximum interest 
rate restrictions.440 
When these amendments take effect, Article 7 of the 2006 law will 
also amend the Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act to lower 
interest rates caps on commercial moneylenders from 29.2% to 20%.441  The 
special ordinances permitting higher interest rates from lending by “daily 
installment lenders” will be abolished.442  The law concludes by mandating 
that the government make efforts to develop comprehensive policies to 
address the problem of distressed borrowers and provides for review of the 
act within two and a half years after enforcement of all its provisions.443 
C. The Fallout from the 2006 Supreme Court Cases and Legislation  
Shortly after the passage of the 2006 law, the Prime Minister’s Office 
established a Distressed Borrowers Task Force.444  It charged the task force 
with developing a counseling program for borrowers, “a social safety net,” 
improving financial and economic education, and strengthening regulation 
of black-market lenders. 
Citigroup boosted loan-loss reserves by $375 million and announced 
that it would shut about 80% of its consumer finance branches and 100 loan 
machines in Japan.445  Acom followed suit announcing it would cut 700 jobs 
and close 135 outlets to reduce costs.446  GE announced it would review its 
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business in Japan “to determine the best way forward.”447  Foreign investors 
announced the legislation was “very clearly the worst-case outcome for the 
consumer finance industry.”448 
While lawyers and activists applauded the legislation, critics 
continued to argue that it will adversely affect the broader economy by 
restricting consumer spending and cause a flood of new bad loans when 
credit dries up for borrowers servicing debt or, worse yet, cause an increase 
in black-market lending.449  The American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo 
suggested the legislation would lead to a “large constriction in the supply of 
credit, undercutting the current economic recovery.”450  Standard & Poor’s 
estimated that the changes will cut outstanding loans at consumer finance 
companies in half from then current levels of ¥14.2 trillion, and if 80% of 
these loans were presumed to be used for consumption, national 
consumption would drop 2% cutting gross domestic product (“GDP”) by 
1.1%. 451 
Quarterly reports for the first part of 2007 suggest that credit has dried 
up for consumers presenting the greatest credit risk.  For the four largest 
finance companies, average loan completion rates and outstanding loan 
balances are down almost 10%.452  Quarterly profits trended up due to cost 
cutting, restructuring, and reduced payouts on claims, but payouts on claims 
are expected to rise again.453  The Supreme Court recently held that 
borrowers may demand interest from the consumer finance companies, at the 
legally prescribed rate of 5%, on all illegal gray zone interest payments 
made to the finance companies.454  The borrowers have now become the 
creditors, earning interest on money unwittingly loaned to the finance 
companies.  Most recently, Promise, the third largest finance company, 
announced its intention to merge with Sanyō Shinpan Finance, the fifth 
largest.455  Other companies are reported to have begun shifting resources to 
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Korea where interest rates are currently capped at 66% and industry 
regulation less severe.456 
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS  
If the GDP numbers are anywhere close to accurate, the legislation 
will measurably harm the Japanese economy, and reports already show that 
it has measureably reduced credit, as expected.  Which raises the question:  
why did the legislation pass?  The question is answered by returning to the 
immediate events that preceded it:  years of recession, growing unease with 
“the debt problem,” an activist Japanese Supreme Court, and younger 
members of the LDP with enough clout to pass legislation providing relief to 
consumers but antithetical to industry and efficient markets. 
A. The Tokugawa Era  
The question can also be answered in a broader context.  This is not 
the first time the Japanese have adopted legislation that constricts the supply 
of credit.  In 1842, a Tokugawa magistrate protested such restrictions.457  His 
recommendations for reform were adopted and almost immediately replaced 
by substantive limitations on interest rates and litigation.458  The same 
question arises there:  why would the Tokugawa Shogunate repeatedly issue 
orders dismissing all money suits and repeatedly adjust interest rate caps 
from 20% to 5%, knowing this was harmful to the broader economy? 
Self-interest is one simple answer.459  It motivated both procedural and 
substantive regulation.  As rulers and arbiters, the Tokugawa made 
procedural modifications seeking efficiency, and they invalidated “charges 
under various names” and incomplete loan instruments seeking 
compliance.460  More importantly, they sought to protect their base.  The 
Tokugawa rulers sat at the apex of a military class of landowners and 
bureaucrats who were prohibited from engaging in commerce but required to 
live according to their station.461  They were heavily in debt and when the 
Council of State and Chamber of Decisions made collection difficult, 
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dismissed all lawsuits, and retroactively reduced interest rates on money 
loans, they protected their own.462  They demonstrated “compassion” for the 
“pecuniary difficulties” of the military gentry, with full recognition that they 
were “injuriously affecting” the circulation of money.463 
The ruling class engaged in an ongoing attempt to substantively 
manage the market without stifling it.464  They sought to impose a 
substantively fair price, no more than fair consideration for money lent.465  If 
recoinage of gold and silver caused an increase in grain prices, that would 
justify higher interest rates.466  Conversely if those grain prices fell, interest 
rates should as well, or the government would decree it so.467  In repeatedly 
adjusting interest rates ex post there was little concern demonstrated for 
procedural fairness and great concern for “fair consideration.”  The 
Tokugawa Shogunate served those in power by substantively managing the 
market. 
Confucian-inspired paternalism offered both a justification for 
regulating the money markets as well as guiding principles in doing so.468  
One sees a fundamentally public law regime wherein civil litigation was 
both disfavored, and yet commonplace.469  “Didactic conciliation”470 
occurred within the shadow of “didactic litigation,” with the government 
using the civil litigation process to enforce a private order outside the 
courts.471  That order dictated that “the lending and borrowing of money 
originates as a matter of private arrangement between the parties, and hence 
there is no necessity for [the court’s] undertaking and judging disputes of 
that sort.”472  It decreed that the parties were to carry out their obligations 
with a “true sense of their mutual duties” or be punished severely.473 
Confucian paternalism explains not only the government’s conception 
of its role in private law disputes and its expectations of the parties, but also 
its willingness to move beyond self-interest.  Tokugawa magistrates sought 
to prohibit representation by “person[s] skilled in litigation,” in order to 
prevent “unfounded suits” for “petty arrearage against country people” and 
                                           
462
  STEENSTRUP, supra note 37, at 146. 
463
  3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 333-334; Wren, supra note 459, at 220. 
464
  See supra text accompanying notes 31-52. 
465
  See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.  
466
  Id.   
467
  Id.   
468
  See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 68, at 52-55. 
469
  Id. at 57-58. 
470
  1 DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW 4-5, 56. 
471
  See supra text accompanying notes 40-45. 
472
  3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 324. 
473
  Id. at 324-25, 334. 
584 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 3 
 
 
suits where “a person takes advantage of the poverty or ignorance of 
another.”474  At the same time, they granted special privileges to the blind as 
creditors475 and, in doing so, again moved beyond simply protecting those in 
power. 
Usury law in Tokugawa Japan evidenced substantive regulation 
stemming from both self-interest and at least an intent to incorporate the 
“reciprocal ethical duties of benevolence” required of those in power and 
discussed in the literature.476  Both influence practice today. 
B. The Meiji, Taisho, and Pre-World War II Showa Eras  
The Meiji Reformation marked a fundamental shift from substantive 
regulation of contract to freedom of contract.  In terms of private law and 
usury law, that shift appeared early on in pronouncements by the Great 
Council of State and the Codification Committee.477  Both adopted a “new” 
philosophy of freedom of contract.478  Boissonade’s proposals codifying 
continued paternalism were vigously debated and rejected.479  The interest 
rate restrictions from the Meiji IRRA remained but only as a compromise.480 
The nineteenth century cases from the Great Court of Cassation 
defined that compromise.481  Professor Kawashima in his writings on 
litigiousness in Japan noted that disputes between a usurer and debtor exist 
in a “social vacuum,” and “[s]ince the Meiji era . . . , long before 
industrialization was under way, official statistics have shown a surprisingly 
large number of cases involving claims of this sort.”482  The courts resolved 
this surprising large number of cases by restrictively interpreting the 
applicability of the IRRA.483  They found the IRRA inapplicable to non-
monetary loans, liquidated damage provisions in monetary loans, and in 
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some cases commercial loans.484  The court followed these cases in the early 
twentieth century by repeatedly invoking the principle of freedom of 
contract in defense of their rejection of borrower’s claims.485  Both were 
accompanied by a shift in focus from the intent of the government to the 
intent of the parties.  In these cases, the courts focused on “the agreement of 
the parties” and rejected claims of unjust enrichment where the interest was 
“voluntarily paid.”486  The courts rejected claims that loans were void as 
against public policy absent “cruel circumstances.”487 
Japanese scholars describe a conservative court narrowly interpreting 
the law.488  There is arguably more to it.  During this period, the court 
evolved from a public law centered organ of the state to a separate judiciary 
sitting as arbiters of private disputes.  This shift from public to private was 
accompanied by an evolution from a substantive conception of justice to a 
formal one.  With few exceptions, private law now focused on the intent of 
the parties and the freedom of those parties to structure their relationship, 
without regard for state interests and limited concern for the public 
welfare.489 
Scholars describe a similar evolution in the United States during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:  from a substantive conception of 
justice to a formal one, one that implemented purely “legal” rules that served 
new interests in a market economy.490  According to Professor Horwitz, by 
the mid-1800s in the United States the early anti-commercial legal doctrines 
found in the common law had been undermined “and the legal system had 
almost completely shed its eighteenth century commitment to regulating the 
substantive fairness of economic exchange.”491 
Law, once conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic 
and, above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense of the 
community, had come to be thought of as facilitative of 
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individual desires and as simply reflective of the existing 
organization of economic and political power.492 
The statement is an apt description of what occurred in Japan during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, but it is not a perfect fit.  The law 
was never perceived of as a paramount expression of the moral sense of the 
community.  It was conceived of as a paramount expression of the moral 
sense of the Tokugawa Shogunate, but it was regulative and paternalistic.493  
With the Meiji Reformation that conception of law changed.  The judiciary 
would interpret substantive regulation such as the IRRA narrowly.494  The 
focus shifted to individual desires and the agreement of the parties, as 
reflected in the contract.495  The courts’ conception of civil justice evolved to 
more closely reflect and facilitate economic power. 
C. The Post-World War II Showa and Heisei Eras 
What is perhaps most remarkable about this evolution is that, in 
contrast to the United States, Japan shifted back.  The Meiji Reformation and 
importation of Western legal ideas helped to develop a new conception of 
private law.  The end of World War II and the rise of an independent 
Supreme Court resulted in a second transformation where the courts again 
committed to enforcing substantive legal standards and the fairness of 
economic exchange, albeit with a far less heavy hand than their Tokugawa 
predecessors and with different beneficiaries.496 
The courts have come once again to view law as a protective, 
regulative, paternalistic and now, above all, a paramount expression of the 
moral sense of the community.  Now, Professor Horwitz’s description is 
entirely apt.  The Japanese courts explicitly voice this when they invoke the 
“consensus of society” (shakai tsūnen) or “sense of society” (shakai kannen) 
in formulating norms and deciding civil law cases.497  While some dismiss 
this as a “hortatory device,” as Professor Haley notes, what is significant is 
that “judges themselves still feel bound by what they themselves discern as 
the community norm.”498 
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Within the civil law sphere, there has been a movement back from a 
formalistic conception of justice, one limited to ensuring procedural fairness.  
After the appointment of ten new post-war Supreme Court justices between 
1962 and 1964, the Supreme Court, prompted by the lower courts, 
changed.499  It became increasingly assertive, enforcing a substantive 
conception of fairness, through very formalistic reasoning.500  The 1954 
IRRA codified the “voluntary payment” doctrine adopted by the Great Court 
of Cassation and limited substantive application of the act.501  The Supreme 
Court in 1964 and 1968 effectively nullified that legislative 
pronouncement.502  They reasoned first by analogy that payment of interest 
beyond the caps was similar to discounted interest and would reduce the 
amount of principle.503  Once that debt on the principal was extinguished, 
payment was made on a “non-debt” and subject to claims of unjust 
enrichment.504  At this point, the court began to explicitly acknowledge a 
need “to protect the economically disadvantaged borrower.”505 
An LDP driven by industry interests and the Diet rolled back this new 
judicial doctrine in 1983 legislation, to counter what one Japanese scholar 
described as “social ordering” by the Supreme Court.506  The lower courts 
immediately began to limit this new legislation, and, after 1990, the 
Supreme Court uniformly agreed.507  The courts left the cries for equity, 
fairness, and debtor protection to the Japanese bar and consumer groups, but 
through strictly “legal” interpretations of narrow aspects of the law the 
Supreme Court changed the whole and changed it drastically.508 
The courts found Article 43 from the 1983 legislation validating gray 
zone interest rate charges applicable only “where the conditions imposed are 
strictly met.”509  The courts strictly interpreted what it meant for the 
borrower to “voluntarily pay interest” and for the lender to provide all the 
required disclosures.510  For the latter, “from the standpoint of consumer 
protection,” that meant “all items” accurately disclosed without exception.511  
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The courts would not countenance a lender using “its superior position” to 
force acceptance of less.512  The courts found it was not that difficult for a 
“large-scale money lender with a nationwide business operation” to comply 
with the disclosure requirements.513  The courts sought to “cause the 
borrower to clearly understand the costs associated with the debt.”514  For 
the borrower, voluntary payment of interest meant payment that was not 
coerced in fact by the threat of liquidated damages or default.  The courts 
would look not only at whether there was compliance with the minimum 
standards established by criminal and administrative regulation, but at the 
“totality of the circumstances” in determining whether the borrower paid 
excess interest charges “of their own free will.”515  In doing so, the courts are 
defining substantive justice, establishing substantive rather than procedural 
standards. 
The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power to review 
sixteen consumer finance cases in eight years, six in 2006, finding each 
contained important issues involving the interpretation of law.516  All of them 
restrictively interpreted the lending laws; all of them found for the borrower.  
In 2003, when the Supreme Court held that guarantee fees paid to guarantee 
companies wholly owned by a lender shall be construed as interest charged 
by the lender, they were imposing substantive restraints rather than 
acknowledging legal forms separating ownership.517  In 2004, when the 
Supreme Court held that Article 18 documents must be provided 
concurrently with or immediately after payment—not twenty days later, not 
ten days later, and not before—they imposed a substantive restraint on 
electronic transactions between the lender and borrower.518  In 2005, when 
the Supreme Court interpreted “good faith” to require the lender disclose the 
borrower’s transaction records and imposed tort liability for failure to do so, 
they substantively regulated the relationship.519  In 2006, when the Supreme 
Court refused to apply Article 43 where there is coercion in fact, where the 
borrower may have felt obliged to pay the excess interest charges to avoid 
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incurring penalities, they nullified Article 43.520  The Court eliminated any 
exception to the IRRA and substantively applied the interest rate caps.521  
When the Supreme Court invalidated the Cabinet Order permitting 
substitution of “the contract number” for “the date of the contract,” it 
enforced a substantive interpretation of the statute that facilitated to the 
greatest extent possible the borrower’s understanding of his debt.522 
At this point, in 2006, the LDP and the Diet followed suit.  The 
younger members of the LDP championed the substantive restrictions 
imposed by the Supreme Court and, despite the best efforts of industry and 
free market advocates, passed legislation that added both substantive and 
procedural protections for the borrower.523  Gray zone interest lending was 
eliminated.524  The interest rate caps were lowered.525  Lenders will now 
have a duty, enforced by administrative sanction, to ensure the borrower 
does not borrow too much, no more than one-third their annual income.526 
Why didn’t the LDP and the Diet simply increase penalties for illegal 
collection tactics?  Scholars have argued that “what Japan really needs is 
facilitation of finance by legitimate institutions to drive the mob out of 
business.”527  Industry has argued that legislative reform should strengthen 
the regulation of illegal practices within the industry.528  A review of the 
cycles of reported abuse, public outcry, and then legislation suggests that 
tens of thousands of Japanese are not commiting suicide and fleeing into the 
night because some nice young man in a suit and tie knocked on their door 
and respectfully asked them to repay the money they owe.  They commit 
suicide and flee into the night because there are employees calling from 
karaoke boxes screaming that they pay the money back, because there are 
employees demanding payment from family and friends, because there are 
employees demanding they sell an eye to repay their loan. 
All of these ills are corrected by ensuring fair process not adjusting 
interest rates.  The Japanese, however, continue to adjust interest rates, and 
the reason is that substantive justice remains important in Japan.  While it 
may have been abandoned in the United States in the nineteenth century, the 
concept of substantive justice remains firmly embedded in Japan in the 
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twenty-first century.529  That in turn leads to a greater acceptance of and 
demand for substantive regulation.  The scandals resulting in new legislation 
arise as a result of the consumer finance companies and black market 
lenders’ harsh collection tactics.  The bureaucracy, Diet, and judiciary 
address the issue by drafting new law as new abuses are uncovered, but they 
are not willing to stop with procedure.  There is a demand for substantive 
justice that leads them to adjust interest rates, adjust maximum penalties and 
liquidated damages, and, in the case of the judiciary, invalidate statutory 
provisions that allow creditors beyond those points.530 
V. CONCLUSION 
In looking at usury law in Japan, the lenders and the borrowers each 
have a story to tell:  from the blind lenders and indebted samurai in 
Tokugawa Japan, to Susumu Kajima the “king of the black market money 
lenders” in post Bubble Japan, and the elderly family that “apologized” for 
their debt by jumping in front of a train.  The ruling authorities, from the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, Meiji Oligarchy, and pre-World War II governments 
to the LDP after the war have also left their mark; some were for, others 
against, and most beholden to the consumer finance industry. 
At the same time, the story of usury law in Japan is in many respects a 
story about the judiciary.  Starting in the Edo period we see judges who did 
not see themselves as judges:  judges who disfavored commerce and 
disfavored litigation; judges who passed judgment as a necessary evil, and 
refused to pass judgment as a matter of policy.  The Meiji Reformation 
changed that by creating a professional judiciary that followed the Civil 
Code model and possessed a fundamentally transformed view of private law, 
litigation and litigants.  Commerce was no longer disfavored, nor was 
litigation to the same degree, but the judiciary had adopted a view of private 
ordering that limited their role.  Within the courts, private law as opposed to 
public law was fundamental, but among unrelated parties so was freedom of 
contract.  Finally, in the years since World War II, the Japanese judiciary has 
come to exercise enormous influence in the realm of private law, far more 
than in public or administrative law, and it no longer limits itself to 
discerning the intent of the parties or seeking to enforce procedural fairness 
in the market. 
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The courts have rejected to a far larger degree than found in the 
United States deeply ingrained notions of freedom of contract and rule by 
and for the market place.  They have found as their raison d’etre leveling the 
playing field in areas of Japanese society that have escaped the attention of 
the bureaucracy and legislature or, more often, where vested interests have 
tied the hands of the bureaucracy and legislature.  Usury regulation in Japan 
provides an example of the postwar judiciary’s repeated willingness not only 
to go against the grain, but to hand down decisions that negate legal norms 
established by the bureaucracy and the Diet. 
In looking at writings on the Japanese judiciary, one sees an evolution 
that does not necessarily reflect this activism.  The Japanese judiciary was 
long viewed “as by far the least influential, much less dangerous, branch” of 
the Japanese government.531  Scholars wrote about the dearth of Supreme 
Court decisions challenging the constitutionality of legislation and 
administrative actions.532 
They were followed by increased attention to the Japanese judiciary’s 
role as “agents of legal change” working to preserve relationships.533  They 
limited community ostracism,534 explusion from the family535 and contested 
divorce.536  They restrictively interpreted lease contracts permitting 
eviction537 and unilateral termination of a business relationship538 or an 
employment relationship.539  According to this scholarship, “[t]he effect is 
less . . . to protect the weak against the strong than to prevent unilateral 
rupture and, in so doing, to confirm community.”540 
Later work noted that judicial activism was not limited to the service 
of stable relationships and community.  The courts have developed broad-
ranging judicial norms governing the resolution of disputes involving traffic 
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accidents,541 bankruptcy,542 and securities law.543  More than maintaining 
relationships, the courts balance the rights and duties of the parties.  In most 
of these cases, the courts have moved to fill a perceived void in public law 
and to provide remedies most suited to a determination of the rights and 
liabilities of private actors.544 
This work again shows judicial activism that does not maintain a 
relationship or social structure.  While most transactions between borrowers 
and consumer finance companies are part of an ongoing relationship, there is 
no “relationship” to preserve.  The parties are antagonistic,545 and when the 
courts repeatedly recognize the right of the borrower to a set-off and 
thereafter claims for unjust enrichment, they extract the borrower from that 
relationship.  This work also shows, contrary to earlier pronouncements, that 
the judiciary exists not simply to fill “lacunae left by legislative and 
administrative inaction”546 but works, at times, in an antagonistic 
relationship with the bureaucracy and the Diet.  The courts in adjudicating 
private law disputes do not necessarily “enforce” or “reflect the policy 
preferences of the LDP,”547 but at times the exact opposite.  Examining the 
pattern of legislation and judicial response in the area of usury law suggests 
that the courts have set out to limit and then nullify those LDP sponsored 
provisions that they found unsuitable.  In this area of the law, the courts have 
focused on applying substantive justice, not LDP policy, and demonstrated 
an intent to protect the weak from the strong, not to confirm community.548 
At the same time, this area of the law shows that the courts are not 
necessarily uniform and do not necessarily march in lockstep with the 
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Supreme Court.  Judges are “virtually life-time employees of a national 
governmental bureaucracy called the judiciary,”549 but that national 
governmental bureaucracy, at least in the area of usury law, has responded to 
and not driven the judges in the lower courts.  The modern Supreme Court 
has, with few exceptions, followed the lead of the lower courts in adopting 
liberal positions that respond to the perceived needs of Japanese society. 
In doing so, it has functioned as a remarkably democratic institution, 
not in terms of bureaucratic structure, but in terms of how normative rules 
are created and what those rules are:  grants of far greater power to the 
individual borrowers than recognized by the Diet or bureaucracy.  That 
power takes the form of increasing recognition of private rights of action and 
far more expansive remedies than contemplated by statute. 
In this context as well, the courts’ treatment of usury law is part of a 
broader trend.  The courts, followed by the Diet, have increasingly 
recognized new private rights of action.550  In the context of usury law, the 
courts repeatedly recognized private rights of action denied in the statutes, 
first in 1964, then in 1968, and again in 2006.551  With other consumer 
contracts, the courts began voiding consumer transactions in the 1990s that 
violated administrative regulations.552  The Diet followed in 2000 enacting 
the Consumer Contract Act codifying new private rights of action.553  
Following years of lower court and then Supreme Court decisions, the Diet 
enacted in 2000 the Financial Product Sales Act recognizing a private right 
of action for the broker’s breach of the “duty to explain.”554 
In 2004, the Diet revised a law regulating telephone, home, and 
catalogue sales (tokushōhō) to incorporate new civil remedies including a 
cause of action for rescission and damages.555  Following years of lower 
court and then Supreme Court decisions, the Diet revised the Commodities 
Exchange Act in 2004 to clarify the brokers’ “duty to explain” and provide 
for civil compensation for breach of that duty.556  In 2004, the Diet revised 
the Securities Exchange Act to strengthen civil liability provisions and add a 
presumption of causation between breach and damages in certain 
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circumstances.557  In 2006, the Japanese Diet overhauled all of the laws 
regulating financial products and passed the Investment Services Act.558  
This new law recognizes multiple private rights of action.559  In short, the 
2006 Supreme Court decisions regarding interest rate restrictions and the 
subsequent revision of the lending laws are part of a much broader trend that 
has and will continue to change the relationship between the Japanese and 
the courts.  As suggested by Japan’s treatment of usury law and the 
consumer finance industry, the increasing recognition of private rights of 
action means that civil litigation, the judiciary, and its conception of 
substantive justice will play a large role in Japan in the years to come. 
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